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LONG-TERM CONTRACTING THE WAY TO RENEWABLE 
ENERGY INVESTMENT: LESSONS FROM BRAZIL APPLIED 
TO THE UNITED STATES 
ABSTRACT 
Fostering development of a renewable energy industry is critical to 
ensuring energy security and sustained economic development. The United 
States recently lost its status as global leader in new financial investment in 
renewable energy, while investment in renewable energy has increased in the 
developing world. For example, Brazil is the sixth largest investor in 
renewable energy and has moved up in renewable energy rankings. It is time 
for the United States to regain its leadership role and create a stable climate 
for renewable energy investment. 
This Comment argues that the current legal framework in the United States 
is inefficient in stimulating continuous investment in electricity generation 
from renewable resources. The start-and-stop approach created by reliance on 
tax incentives, a patchwork of state laws, and the inability of many power 
producers to secure long-term power purchase agreements fail to provide 
potential investors with the long-term predictability they need. An examination 
of Brazil’s legal framework for investment in renewable energy demonstrates 
that a mechanism that assures a certain return on investment over a long 
period of time is crucial to promote continuous investment in renewable energy 
projects and related industries. 
This Comment ultimately recommends that the United States encourage 
more continuous investment in renewable energy by adopting a national 
renewable portfolio standard and requiring utilities to enter into long-term 
contracts with nonutility power producers through a competitive process to 
meet the requirement, unless a utility can meet it in a more cost-effective 
manner by generating the required amount of renewable energy itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As of 2010, the United States still relied on fossil fuels for about 81% of its 
primary energy requirements.1 In contrast, renewable resources—those that 
“regenerate and can be sustained indefinitely”2—supplied about 8% of energy 
consumed and electricity generated in the United States.3 Even though total 
new financial investment in renewable energy in the United States has been 
growing,4 the overall increase in renewable energy generation has been small 
and unsteady.5 Moreover, in recent years the United States lost to China the 
position of global leader in new, renewable energy investment6 and, until May 
2013, the position of most attractive country for renewable energy in Ernst & 
Young’s quarterly Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Indices.7 
 
 1 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0384(2011), ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 5 tbl.1.1 (2012) 
[hereinafter ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011]. This compares with about 72% in 1978. Id. 
 2 Renewable Energy Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index. 
cfm?page=renewable_home (last updated May 25, 2012) (listing biomass, water (hydropower), geothermal, 
wind, and solar as the most used renewable resources). 
 3 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.1.1. By comparison, in 1978 renewable 
resources supplied about 5% of energy consumed. Id. 
 4 See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME & BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., GLOBAL TRENDS IN 
RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2012, at 15 fig.3 (2012) [hereinafter UNEP & BNEF 2012], available at 
http://fs-unep-centre.org/sites/default/files/publications/globaltrendsreport2012.pdf; UNITED NATIONS ENV’T 
PROGRAMME & BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., GLOBAL TRENDS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2011, 
at 18 (2011) [hereinafter UNEP & BNEF 2011], available at http://fs-unep-centre.org/sites/default/files/media/ 
sefi2011finallowres.pdf. For example, new financial investment in renewable energy grew 58% to over $25 
billion in 2010. UNEP & BNEF 2011, supra, at 9, 18 (including biofuel projects). In 2011, it grew 57% to 
$50.8 billion. UNEP & BNEF 2012, supra, at 15 fig.3. 
 5 See supra note 3 and accompanying text; cf. Steven Ferrey, Follow the Money! Article I and Article VI 
Constitutional Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 89, 100 (2012), 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol17/issue2/v17_i2_89-Ferrey.pdf (“All policy incentives have failed to substantially 
increase the deployment of renewable energy technologies on a percentage basis at the national scale.”).  
 6 See UNEP & BNEF 2012, supra note 4, at 15 fig.3 (showing the United States’ 2011 new investment 
as $50.8 billion and China’s as $52.2 billion); Barry Stevens, Can Renewable Energy Survive in the U.S.?, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD.COM (Oct. 25, 2011), www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/ 
10/can-renewable-energy-survive-in-the-u-s.  
 7 In February 2013, Ernst & Young ranked the United States third most attractive country for renewable 
energy, behind China and Germany. ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 36, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY 
ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 16 (2013) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG FEB. 2013]. This represented a fall in the 
rankings over the past few years. From August 2010 to August 2012, the United States held second place in 
the same ranking. See ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 34, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 
20 (2012) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG AUG. 2012]; ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 33, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 20 (2012) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2012]; ERNST & YOUNG, 
ISSUE 32, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 14 (2012) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG 
FEB. 2012]; ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 31, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 13 (2011) 
[hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG NOV. 2011] (depicting the ranking for August 2011, as well, in parentheses next 
to the November 2011 ranking); ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 29, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY 
ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 15 (2011) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2011]; ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 28, 
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Slow growth of renewable energy in the United States has been attributed 
to various factors, including the following: high capital costs; low power 
purchase agreement (PPA) rates; inability to lock in long-term purchase 
agreements; regulatory hurdles; demise of key federal incentives; and erosion 
of Congress’s support for subsidies.8 Since 2008, a fall in natural gas prices has 
exacerbated these barriers by promoting the building of natural gas plants and 
depressing further contract terms for renewable energy projects.9 
The United States’ fall to China as global leader in new, renewable energy 
investment represented a trend of energy investment shifting toward 
developing countries.10 In various regions of the developing world, investment 
in renewable energy has increased as governments strive to diversify their 
country’s energy mix.11 For example, in 2010, new financial investment in 
renewable energy in South and Central America, excluding Brazil, nearly 
tripled.12 Brazil itself was the world’s sixth largest investor in renewable 
energy as of 2012.13 It produces almost all of the world’s sugar-based ethanol 
and has been working to add more small hydroelectric, biomass, and wind 
power to its energy mix.14 In fact, largely due to strong growth in its wind 
 
RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 11 (2011); ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 27, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 11 (2010); ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 26, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 10 (2010). Moreover, previous to that Ernst & 
Young ranked the United States the number one most attractive country for renewable energy. ERNST & 
YOUNG, ISSUE 25, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 10 (2010); ERNST & YOUNG, 
ISSUE 24, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 9 (2010). The United States was once 
again given the number one spot in the May 2013 rankings. ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 37, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 16 (2013) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2013]. The report attributes 
this rise largely to “[h]igh barriers to entry for external investors” in China (while also pointing out that the 
growth prospects for the sector in China remain strong). Id. at 5, 17. Given this explanation and the trend over 
the past few years, it remains to be seen whether the United States will retain the number one spot in future 
rankings. 
 8 Stevens, supra note 6. As an example of high capital costs, as of 2011, a solar farm cost about $3.25 
per watt whereas a gas-fired electric plant cost under $1.25 per watt. Id.  
 9 See ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2011, supra note 7 (stating that “lack of liquidity in power offtake 
arrangements remain the major barrier” to wind projects in light of low gas prices in the United States); UNEP 
& BNEF 2011, supra note 4, at 16 (noting that for most of 2010, the benchmark rate for natural gas was 
between $3 and $5/MMBTu, compared with $13/MMBTu in 2008). 
 10 See UNEP & BNEF 2011, supra note 4, at 6. 
 11 See id. at 17–24 (describing various government actions). 
 12 See id. at 23.  
 13 KPMG INT’L, TAXES AND INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY 13 (2012). 
 14 KPMG INT’L, TAXES AND INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY 3, 10 (2011). 
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market, Brazil broke into the top ten ranked countries in Ernst & Young’s 
November 2011 Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Indices.15 
Around the world, countries such as Brazil, China, India, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom have been working to reap the benefits that renewable energy 
offers.16 Diversification of a country’s energy matrix to include more 
renewable energy can promote economic development, national security, and 
environmental sustainability.17 The environmental ramifications seem to be 
clear. Conventional fossil fuels pollute the air and water, and they contribute to 
global warming.18 Producing electricity using renewable resources can mitigate 
these negative environmental effects.19 Avoiding such pollutants results in 
economic benefits such as lower health care costs.20 Additional economic 
benefits derive from spending more locally to build and maintain the 
renewable energy facilities than on costly resource inputs from other countries 
 
 15 ERNST & YOUNG NOV. 2011, supra note 7, at 13–14. As of May 2009, Brazil was ranked number 
twenty. ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 21, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 10 (2009) 
[hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2009]. Between November 2011, when Brazil first broke into the top ten, 
and February 2013, Brazil’s spot in the ranking varied between number nine and number eleven. ERNST & 
YOUNG MAY 2012, supra note 7 (ranking Brazil at number nine); ERNST & YOUNG FEB. 2013, supra note 7 
(ranking Brazil at number 11); see also ERNST & YOUNG, ISSUE 35, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY 
ATTRACTIVENESS INDICES 21 (2012) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG NOV. 2012] (ranking Brazil at number ten); 
ERNST & YOUNG AUG. 2012, supra note 7 (same); ERNST & YOUNG FEB. 2012, supra note 7 (same). Brazil’s 
overall score increased from 44 to 50.5 over the same period. ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2009, supra; ERNST & 
YOUNG FEB. 2013, supra note 7. In comparison, the United States’ score fell from 70 to 64.9. ERNST & YOUNG 
MAY 2009, supra; ERNST & YOUNG FEB. 2013, supra note 7. In the most recent May 2013 ranking, Brazil fell 
to number 15. See ERNST & YOUNG MAY 2013, supra note 7, at 16. The rankings attribute this fall to 
government proposals for domestic content rules and transmission requirements for wind projects that would 
likely increase project costs and intensify competition, as well as the recent cancellation of auctions. Id. at 5, 
12. This fall in the rankings is clearly inconsistent with the trend of recent years. It remains to be seen whether 
this fall will be permanent. The May 2013 rankings also employed a new methodology to reflect a changed 
landscape for energy investment. Id. at 5. Under this new methodology, Brazil’s score rose slightly to 50.7 
while the United States’ score increased to 71.6. See id. at 16. Even taking this new methodology into account, 
the total increase in Brazil’s score from May 2009 to May 2013 (44 to 50.7) is greater than the total increase in 
the United States’ score (70 to 71.6). Additionally, while Brazil fell in the May 2013 rankings, its total score 
did not decrease. 
 16 See ERNST & YOUNG NOV. 2011, supra note 7, at 18–30 (discussing countries’ efforts). 
 17 See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction and Overview to THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY 
AND RENEWABLES 1, 18 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011); Clean Energy, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/technology_and_impacts/impacts/public-benefits-of-renewable.html (last 
revised Apr. 8, 2013). 
 18 See, e.g., Gerrard, supra note 17, at 1; Clean Energy, supra note 17. 
 19 Clean Energy, supra note 17. 
 20 See id.; cf. Gerrard, supra note 17, at 1 (reporting that urban air pollution leads to nearly 800,000 
deaths worldwide each year).  
CHACON GALLEYSPROOFS1 7/11/2013  2:01 PM 
2013] LONG-TERM CONTRACTING 1569 
or states.21 In addition, using renewable energy reduces the country’s 
vulnerability to volatile fossil fuel prices, which may benefit ratepayers by 
stabilizing electricity rates.22 
However, to achieve these beneficial results, special legal frameworks to 
encourage investment in renewable energy are necessary because the capital 
costs associated with renewable energy projects are higher than for 
conventional power plants.23 The frameworks governments use vary greatly, 
but they generally attempt to compensate for high costs by subsidizing 
renewable energy, establishing special power-purchasing rules, and lowering 
transaction costs.24 Currently, the United States encourages investment in 
renewable energy largely through subsidies in the form of short-term tax 
incentives and state renewable energy mandates.25 
This Comment focuses on the current legal framework to encourage 
investment in electricity generation from renewable resources in the United 
States.26 It is premised on the fact that the United States has already decided to 
promote renewable energy, as demonstrated by various measures it has 
adopted to do so. It considers those laws that have been most successful in 
encouraging investment in renewable energy in the United States.27 Based on 
an analysis of the current U.S. legal framework and a study of Brazil’s efforts 
to diversity its energy mix, which have contributed to its increasing recognition 
as a renewables powerhouse, this Comment argues most specifically that the 
 
 21 See Benefits of Renewable Energy, NEXTERA ENERGY RESOURCES, http://www. 
nexteraenergyresources.com/content/environment/benefits.shtml (last visited July 1, 2013). For example, Iowa 
and Massachusetts import about 97% of the energy they use. Clean Energy, supra note 17. 
 22 See Clean Energy, supra note 17; see also ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, supra note 1, at 215 tbl.7.9 
(reporting coal prices between 1949 and 2010); Price of U.S. Natural Gas Imports, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9100us3m.htm (last updated June 28, 2013) (depicting fluctuation in 
natural gas import prices between 2000 and 2012). 
 23 See Fredric Beck & Eric Martinot, Renewable Energy Policies and Barriers, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ENERGY 365, 366–67 (Cutler J. Cleveland ed., 2004). Furthermore, conventional sources of energy are 
subsidized, making it hard for renewable energy to compete if not put on equal footing. See generally U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DIRECT FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS AND SUBSIDIES IN ENERGY IN FISCAL 
YEAR 2010, at 1 (2011) (providing “a snapshot of direct federal financial interventions and subsidies in energy 
markets . . . focusing on subsidies to electricity production”). 
 24 See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 370–76. 
 25 See infra Part II.B–C. 
 26 This Comment does not consider renewable energy in forms other than electricity and also does not 
consider alternative, but not renewable, forms of energy such as nuclear.  
 27 It does not consider other roadblocks to developing renewable energy projects, such as siting and 
environmental licensing. See generally Patricia E. Salkin, Facility Siting and Permitting, in THE LAW OF 
CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 17, at 95, 95–114 (discussing siting and permitting of renewable energy projects). 
These are crucial elements of facilitating the development of renewable energy and deserve separate attention. 
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United States should modify the federal framework to increase access for 
power producers using renewable resources to long-term PPAs with electric 
utilities. 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of investment programs for 
renewable energy, as well as the hallmarks of an efficient renewable-energy 
legal framework. Part II then analyzes the existing legal framework to promote 
investment in renewable energy in the United States. It argues that the current 
framework creates unnecessary investment costs and does not provide the 
long-term predictability necessary to stimulate continuous investment. Part III 
focuses on Brazil’s renewable energy model and Part IV draws lessons from 
Brazil’s experience to apply in the United States. Finally, Part V recommends 
and concludes that the United States should show its commitment to renewable 
energy by adopting a national renewable portfolio standard (RPS) requiring 
electric utilities to purchase, on a competitive basis through long-term 
contracts with nonutility power producers, a specific percentage of the 
electricity that the utilities supply to their consumers, unless a utility can 
generate the required amount itself more cheaply. 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT IN RENEWABLE ENERGY 
While renewable energy offers many advantages, various impediments 
inherent to its use stall the industry’s growth. One challenge is that most of the 
costs of renewable energy projects are for “up-front capital.”28 Once in 
operation, fuel costs for projects such as a solar or wind farm are minimal.29 
Regardless, higher initial capital costs mean that a renewable energy project 
provides less installed capacity per dollar invested, and requires greater 
amounts of up-front financing, than a conventional power plant.30 
Another barrier to using renewable energy is intermittency.31 Most 
renewable resources are intermittent: “[t]he wind does not always blow and the 
sun does not always shine.”32 Additional roadblocks stem from the level of 
technological development and concerns about technical reliability of 
renewable energy equipment.33 
 
 28 E.g., Gerrard, supra note 17, at 12.  
 29 See, e.g., id. 
 30 Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 366. 
 31 E.g., Gerrard, supra note 17, at 11.  
 32 See id. 
 33 See Braden W. Penhoet, Financing Structures and Transactions, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, 
supra note 17, at 241, 242. 
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The unique risks and high capital costs reduce the amount of affordable 
financing available to renewable energy projects and make an effective legal 
framework to stimulate investment that much more important.34 Financing, the 
tools used to encourage investment in renewable energy, and the hallmarks of 
an effective renewable-energy legal framework are discussed below in Parts 
I.A to I.C, respectively. 
A. Financing a Renewable Energy Project 
Facilities producing electrical energy from renewable resources may be 
constructed and operated by various types of entities, including nonutility 
power producers. An independent power producer (IPP), for example, is an 
independent generator of electricity that uses the transmission facilities of 
utilities to deliver power to customers.35 It sells its power with authorization 
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and its service 
obligation is defined by the terms of its power sales contracts—usually a PPA 
with a utility or third party.36 The PPA sets forth the obligations of the power 
producer and power purchaser, as well as the price the power producer will 
receive.37 
Renewable energy projects often require equity and debt financing.38 Power 
producers that do not have enough tax liabilities to take advantage of the large 
tax incentives available in the United States find tax equity investors who do.39 
A tax equity investor contributes capital in return for tax benefits equal to the 
capital contribution and a return on the investment.40 Thus, potential returns 
from a renewable energy project must be predictable enough to entice 
investment.41 
 
 34 See id. at 241.  
 35 Electric Power Industry Overview 2007, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/ 
page/prim2/toc2.html (last visited July 1, 2013). 
 36 Id. 
 37 E.g., Craig M. Kline, Solar, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 17, at 391, 409.  
 38 See generally Penhoet, supra note 33, at 242–57 (discussing various financing structures). 
 39 E.g., PAUL SCHWABE ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., NREL/TP-6A2-44930, RENEWABLE 
ENERGY PROJECT FINANCING: IMPACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION 2–3 (2009). 
 40 Id. at 5. 
 41 Cf. MICHAEL MENDELSOHN & JOHN HARPER, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., NREL/TP-6A20-
53720, § 1603 TREASURY GRANT EXPIRATION: INDUSTRY INSIGHT ON FINANCING AND MARKET IMPLICATIONS 
18 (2012) (“As a general rule . . . tax equity investors are conservative in their tolerance for risk.”). 
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One common way to use debt to finance a renewable energy project is 
called “project finance.”42 Project finance allows an entity to manage risk by 
isolating substantial project-related debts in a separate entity.43 Under these 
structures, project revenues alone repay the loan.44 As such, project lenders 
need high levels of confidence in the project’s ability to generate reliable 
revenue over the course of the loan.45 
Therefore, both creditors and equity investors require evidence of a 
project’s ability to generate consistent and sufficient levels of revenue. 
Commitments from customers, such as in the form of a PPA, are often key to 
securing both debt and equity financing.46 
B. Mechanisms Used to Encourage Investment in Renewable Energy 
Given the financing needs of renewable energy projects, governments 
around the world use legal frameworks to promote investment in renewable 
energy.47 The frameworks differ to some extent but are largely variations on 
and combinations of a standard set of tools.48 
As Part II discusses, the most significant tools in the United States are tax 
incentives and state RPSs. RPSs encourage investment in renewable energy by 
requiring utilities to source a percentage of the electricity they sell from 
renewable resources or purchase renewable energy credits (RECs) from other 
sources to meet the quota.49 Tax incentives, on the other hand, attempt to drive 
investment in renewable energy by making its development more economically 
attractive to investors.50 
Differently, feed-in tariffs (FITs) and auctions focus on ensuring that power 
producers using renewable resources (“renewable-energy power producers”) 
will be able to sell the electricity they generate over a period of time at a 
 
 42 E.g., Penhoet, supra note 33, at 255–56. 
 43 Id. at 255. 
 44 See id. at 256. 
 45 Id. 
 46 E.g., id. 
 47 See, e.g., KPMG INT’L, supra note 13, at 6–49. 
 48 See, e.g., Gerrard, supra note 17, at 14–18; see also KPMG INT’L, supra note 13, at 1.  
 49 E.g., Joshua P. Fershee, Renewables Mandates and Goals, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 
17, at 77, 77; see also infra Part II.C.  
 50 See, e.g., KPMG INT’L, supra note 13, at 1; infra Part II.B. 
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certain price.51 The tools differ in that FITs generally require utilities to buy 
electricity from renewable energy projects at a government-mandated price 
above the market rate, whereas under an auction system renewable-energy 
power producers bid for contracts and only those bidders offering the lowest 
price actually secure a contract.52 These tools are discussed in Part III since 
Brazil has experience with both. 
C. The Hallmarks of an Effective Renewable Energy Investment Framework 
Generally, a legal framework that fosters long-term investment is one that 
investors perceive as stable and predictable.53 The framework also must not 
unnecessarily increase the costs or risks of doing business.54 
In accordance with these general investment principles, to effectively 
promote investment in renewable energy, a government’s legal framework 
must be simple, consistent, and predictable.55 It must set the stage for investors 
to earn a high enough return to compensate for any uncertainties so that the 
renewable energy project can secure financing.56 The framework can do so in 
part by eliminating unnecessary costs.57 A long-term guarantee to purchase 
 
 51 See Toby Couture, Feed-in Tariffs or Bidding: How Best to Assign Renewable Contracts, WIND-
WORKS.ORG (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.wind-works.org/cms/index.php?id=39&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D= 
1225&cHash=0cab70c9655f6cff7f295123e2e136e4 (comparing FITs and auctions and noting that successful 
bidders in auctions are awarded contracts). 
 52 Id.; see also infra Part III.A–B. As noted, legal frameworks often utilize a combination of these tools. 
For example, the California Public Utilities Commission authorized a renewable auction mechanism to procure 
renewable energy from small projects eligible for the California RPS Program. Decision Adopting the 
Renewable Auction Mechanism, Decision 10-12-048, Rulemaking 08-08-009, at 2 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n 
Dec. 17, 2010). The purpose was, among others, to promote competition and secure low costs for ratepayers, 
and to contribute to short-term RPS goals. Id. 
 53 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Role of International Investment 
Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries, 15, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5 (2009) [hereinafter UNCTAD]; see also Treaty Concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4, 2005, T.I.A.S. No. 06-1101 (“Agreeing that a 
stable framework for investment will maximize effective utilization of economic resources and improve living 
standards”). 
 54 See UNCTAD, supra note 53, at 40. 
 55 E.g., TOBY D. COUTURE ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., NREL/TP-6A2-44849, A 
POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE TO FEED-IN TARIFF POLICY DESIGN 11 (2010); Randall Swisher & Kevin Porter, 
Renewable Policy Lessons from the US: The Need for Consistent and Stable Policies, in RENEWABLE ENERGY 
POLICY AND POLITICS: A HANDBOOK FOR DECISION-MAKING 185, 185 (Karl Mallon ed., 2006). 
 56 E.g., DIMITRIS N. CHORAFAS, ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT, NATURAL RESOURCES AND BUSINESS 
COMPETITIVENESS: THE FRAGILITY OF INTERDEPENDENCE 90 (2011). 
 57 See Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42 ENVTL. L. 681, 711, 
713–14 (2012); cf. UNCTAD, supra note 53, at 40 (noting a study in which the authors hypothesized that 
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electricity generated by the project can help by increasing investment 
security.58 The long-term contract can mitigate risk by immunizing investors 
against future changes that would affect revenue generation.59 
The following Part demonstrates that the United States, through its reliance 
on tax incentives and state RPSs, fails to provide the simple, long-term, and 
predictable framework developers need to secure the lowest cost financing 
possible.60 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
There are numerous federal laws encouraging the use and development of 
renewable energy in the United States.61 Yet a few of these laws impact 
investment in renewable energy projects more significantly than the rest.62 
While these laws have led to investment in renewable energy, they have failed 
to create a stable and predictable investment environment in which investment 
occurs continuously.63 To complement the federal framework, states have 
enacted their own renewable energy laws.64 These laws have increased 
 
having more host-country bilateral investment treaties reduced costs associated with long-term capital 
investment in the host country, which led, in turn, to increased foreign direct investment). 
 58 Karsten Neuhoff, Large-Scale Deployment of Renewables for Electricity Generation, in THE NEW 
ENERGY PARADIGM 288, 314 (Dieter Helm ed., 2007); see also Decision Adopting the Renewable Auction 
Mechanism, Decision 10-12-048, Rulemaking 08-08-009, at 14 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Dec. 17, 2010) 
(listing the goals of (1) lowering transaction costs and (2) executing contracts for financeable prices when 
setting the auction prices mechanism). 
 59 Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314. 
 60 See Ronald H. Rosenberg, Harmonious Federalism in Support of National Energy Goals—Increased 
Wind Renewable Energy, 85 N.D. L. REV. 781, 793–94, 805–06 (2009) (noting that there is no long-term 
federal strategy to promote wind energy).  
 61 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 902(a) (2012) (allowing the Secretary of Agriculture to make loans for renewable 
energy systems under a rural electrification program); 10 U.S.C. § 2922b (2012) (requiring the secretary of a 
military department to procure systems that use renewable energy whenever possible and practical); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 15852 (2006) (mandating that at least 7.5% of electrical energy the federal government consumes must be 
renewable by the 2013 fiscal year).  
 62 See, e.g., DIPA SHARIF ET AL., BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., THE RETURN—AND RETURNS—OF TAX 
EQUITY FOR US RENEWABLE PROJECTS 1 (2011); RYAN WISER ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., 
LBNL-63583, USING THE FEDERAL PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT TO BUILD A DURABLE MARKET FOR WIND 
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2007). 
 63 E.g., Swisher & Porter, supra note 55; Stevens, supra note 6. 
 64 See infra Part II.C. 
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renewable energy generation but have also resulted in a patchwork that makes 
compliance complex and costly.65 
Overall, the current U.S. legal framework does not provide the long-term 
stability developers of renewable energy projects need to secure low-cost 
financing (or often any financing at all). This Part demonstrates the need to 
overhaul the current framework to ensure a stable environment in which 
renewable-energy power producers have access to long-term PPAs.66 Section 
A addresses the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA). PURPA 
initially spurred investment but has failed to do so recently,67 causing greater 
reliance on federal tax incentives.68 Those tax incentives are explored in 
section B. Last, section C considers some of the mechanisms states have 
adopted to promote renewable energy development. 
A. PURPA: An Antiquated Approach to Encouraging Renewable Energy 
Investment 
PURPA stimulated investment in renewable energy by creating a market 
for small power producers.69 It was enacted in 1978 in response to 
“skyrocketing prices for energy, high inflation, economic stagnation, and 
dependence on [foreign oil].”70 Among Congress’s findings when enacting the 
legislation were the following: 
[T]he protection of the public health, safety, and welfare, the 
preservation of national security, and the proper exercise of 
congressional authority under the Constitution to regulate interstate 
commerce require[d]— 
 
 65 Mormann, supra note 57, at 725–26; Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got It 
Wrong: The Case for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for Policy, 3 ENVTL. & 
ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85, 88 (2008). 
 66 See Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314; Stevens, supra note 6. 
 67 See Eric Martinot et al., Renewable Energy Policies and Markets in the United States, CENTER FOR 
RESOURCE SOLUTIONS, http://www.resource-solutions.org/lib/librarypdfs/IntPolicy-RE.policies.markets.US. 
pdf (last visited June 15, 2013) (noting that “PURPA’s influence faded in the 1990s”); Public Utility 
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/ 
solutions/big_picture_solutions/public-utility-regulatory.html (last visited July 1, 2013). 
 68 Cf. SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62 (“Tax credits are likely to again become the most important subsidies 
supporting renewable project development in the [United States] . . . .”). 
 69 E.g., Richard F. Hirsh, PURPA: The Spur to Competition and Utility Restructuring, ELECTRICITY J., 
Aug.–Sept. 1999, at 60, 63–64; Or. Dep’t of Energy, Federal Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 
(PURPA): Update March 2006, OREGON.GOV (Mar. 2006), http://www.oregon.gov/energy/RENEW/docs/ 
PURPA_update_March06.pdf; Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), supra note 67. 
 70 Hirsh, supra note 69, at 61–62. 
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(1) a program providing for increased conservation of electric 
energy, increased efficiency in the use of facilities and resources by 
electric utilities, and equitable retail rates for electric consumers, 
(2) a program to improve the wholesale distribution of electric 
energy [and] the reliability of electric service . . . 
. . . . 
(4) a program for the conservation of natural gas while insuring 
that rates to natural gas consumers are equitable . . . .71 
As part of its efforts to achieve these goals, Congress created a class of 
qualifying facilities (QFs), including cogenerators72 and small power producers 
using renewable resources, which would receive special rate treatment.73 
PURPA directed FERC74 to prescribe rules requiring electric utilities to 
offer to purchase electricity from QFs.75 It specified that the purchase rates 
paid to QFs “be just and reasonable to the electric consumers of the electric 
utility and in the public interest” and “not discriminate against” the QFs.76 
However, no rule could require a utility to pay a rate that “exceeds the 
incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy.”77 
As implemented, QFs can sell to a utility at the utility’s avoided cost or at 
another negotiated rate.78 The utility’s “[a]voided cost is the incremental cost 
to [the] electric utility of electric energy or capacity which, but for the 
purchase from the QF, such utility would generate itself or purchase from 
 
 71 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92 Stat. 3117, 3119 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006)). 
 72 A cogeneration facility produces electric energy and steam or other forms of useful energy for 
“industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling purposes.” 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)(A). 
 73 PURPA § 210, 92 Stat. at 3144–47 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3); What is a Qualifying 
Facility?, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/what-
is.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2012).  
 74 FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale power transactions and prices. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1); Steven 
Ferrey et al., Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront 
Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 125, 180 (2010). 
 75 PURPA § 210(a), 92 Stat. at 3144 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)). The Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 repealed the mandatory purchase requirement for areas with independent transmission operators 
and viable spot markets. Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 1253(a), § 210(m)(1), 119 Stat. 594, 967–68 (codified at 16 
U.S.C. § 824a-3(m)(1)); Or. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 69. 
 76 PURPA § 210(b), 92 Stat. at 3144 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)). 
 77 Id. The incremental cost is “the cost to the electric utility of the electric energy which, but for the 
purchase from such cogenerator or small power producer, such utility would generate or purchase from 
another source.” PURPA § 210(d), 92 Stat. at 3145 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d)). 
 78 What Are the Benefits of QF Status?, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/indu-
stries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/benefits.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2012). 
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another source.”79 At the same time, FERC’s rules allowed each state to 
develop its own method to calculate avoided cost80 and determine whether to 
require long-term contracts.81 Not requiring long-term contracts is problematic 
because nonutility power producers need long-term contracts to attract 
affordable financing.82 
Although PURPA initially stimulated investment in renewable energy, its 
structure is wrought with problems and it is no longer as effective.83 The first 
problem is that wide state discretion resulted in a patchwork of implementation 
methodologies.84 California, for example, established a generous regime 
assuring QFs a fixed rate over a ten-year period.85 The rates granted reflected 
the belief that oil costs (and avoided costs) would escalate.86 When oil prices 
fell, the utilities had to continue paying QFs the high rate contracted for even 
though their avoided costs had fallen with oil and gas prices.87 In other states, 
utilities had broad authority to determine the inputs on which avoided cost 
calculations were based.88 This discretion “create[d] inconsistency and 
put[] . . . downward pressure on avoided cost rates.”89 Yet another set of states 
implemented bidding schemes under which QFs bid for a certain amount of 
capacity.90 
 
 79 Id. 
 80 CAROLYN ELEFANT, REVIVING PURPA’S PURPOSE: THE LIMITS OF EXISTING STATE AVOIDED COST 
RATEMAKING METHODOLOGIES IN SUPPORTING ALTERNATIVE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND A PROPOSED PATH 
FOR REFORM 10–36 (2011), available at http://lawofficesofcarolynelefant.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ 
Elefant_Reviving_PURPA_Avoided_Costs_2011-dated.pdf (discussing state methodologies); Swisher & 
Porter, supra note 55, at 186–88 (same); see also 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (2012) (establishing factors that must 
be considered “to the extent practicable” when determining avoided costs). 
 81 See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d) (stating that each QF “shall have the option either” of providing energy as 
available or under a contract for a “specified term”). 
 82 ELEFANT, supra note 80, at 3; see also COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at viii–ix (“Longer contract 
periods help lower levelized payments, ensure cost recovery, lower the cost of financing, and increase investor 
confidence.”); Stevens, supra note 6.  
 83 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), supra note 67; see also Fershee, supra note 49, at 77 
(stating that PURPA’s role has largely been supplanted by state RPSs). 
 84 See ELEFANT, supra note 80. 
 85 E.g., Martinot et al., supra note 67. The contract was for fifteen to thirty years, but the price was fixed 
for ten. Id.  
 86 Hirsh, supra note 69, at 63.  
 87 See id. 
 88 ELEFANT, supra note 80, at 2–3.  
 89 Id. 
 90 Hirsh, supra note 69, at 66. State regulators and FERC appeared to view auctions as “compatible with 
the spirit and letter of PURPA.” Id. 
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With respect to contracts, many jurisdictions did not require long-term 
contracts.91 Idaho, for example, originally required twenty-year contracts, but 
later modified that to five-year contracts due to unwillingness to commit to 
high prices.92 Evidently, FERC’s guidelines did not result in uniform practices. 
One commentator noted that avoided-cost ratemaking has confounded 
developers and regulators alike due to its “Byzantine nature . . . at the state 
level.”93 Thus, wide state discretion created a complex system that does not 
provide investors the predictability they need to make long-term investment 
decisions. 
The other major problem with PURPA is its setting avoided cost as the 
highest price that a utility could be required to pay a QF. When oil and gas 
prices are high, avoided cost rates may be sufficient to promote investment in 
renewable energy.94 In recent years, however, the price of oil has declined and 
natural gas supplies have increased, greatly lowering the avoided cost for 
utilities.95 Avoided cost calculations generally do not consider extrinsic costs 
such as environmental degradation.96 Were these extrinsic costs included, the 
avoided cost would increase, making renewable energy more competitive.97 In 
most states, however, such a low cap does not assure investors of adequate 
return on their investment.98 Although utilities could agree to a higher rate, it is 
tough to convince a utility to pay a higher price unless otherwise required.99 
 
 91 ELEFANT, supra note 80, at 33–36. 
 92 See Martinot et al., supra note 67. The optimal contract length for renewable energy projects is, on 
average, at least twenty years. See infra Part IV.A. 
 93 ELEFANT, supra note 80, at 2. 
 94 See Martinot et al., supra note 67. 
 95 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), supra note 67; see also Beck & Martinot, supra note 
23, at 371 (stating that by the 1990s, energy prices had not risen as expected and new natural-gas-fired 
generation came on-line, causing renewable energy to be less competitive).  
 96 See Ferrey et al., supra note 74, at 142. 
 97 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), supra note 67.  
 98 COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at 17. PURPA is sometimes considered the original FIT policy. Id. at 
9; Martinot et al., supra note 67. FITS are the most widely used policy in the world to accelerate renewable 
energy deployment. E.g., COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at 1. Typical FITs reduce risk of investment in 
renewable energy by guaranteeing access to the electric grid, providing stable long-term PPAs, and setting 
payment levels based on the cost of renewable energy generation. Id. at vi. Thus, PURPA does not share the 
characteristics of most effective FITs.  
 99 Cf. Ferrey et al., supra note 74, at 201 (noting that a utility that voluntarily agrees to a rate above 
avoided cost may be faced with a legal challenge as “‘imprudent’”); Erin Dewey, Note, Sundown and You 
Better Take Care: Why Sunset Provisions Harm the Renewable Energy Industry and Violate Tax Principles, 
52 B.C. L. REV. 1105, 1113 (2011) (arguing that utilities will not enter long-term contracts for renewable 
energy when the short-term price for traditional energy is lower). 
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B. Tax Incentives: Creating a Boom-and-Bust Investment Cycle 
Along with PURPA, the federal government began adopting tax incentives 
to encourage investment in renewable energy projects. The primary tax 
incentives include the Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC)100 and the 
Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC).101 These credits have 
been in place for several years102 and have been renewed and modified 
multiple times.103 At times they have been complemented by additional tax 
incentives or non-tax incentive schemes.104 Reliance on an “on-again, off-
again” tax system creates an unstable investment environment in which entities 
hesitate to make long-term investment decisions leading up to the credit’s 
expiration, resulting in a boom-and-bust cycle.105 
The PTC provides a tax credit based on the amount of electricity produced 
from renewable energy projects and sold by the taxpayer during a ten-year 
period.106 The PTC expires in different years depending on the technology 
used.107 It is generally renewed for only a couple of years and, on three 
occasions, was allowed to expire first, leaving a gap in coverage.108 
 
 100 I.R.C. § 48 (Supp. III 2010); see also Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC), DSIRE, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US02F (last updated Jan. 3, 2013) 
[hereinafter DSIRE ITC]. 
 101 I.R.C. § 38(b)(8) (2006); id. § 45 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); see also Renewable Electricity Production 
Tax Credit (PTC), DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US13F&re= 
1&ee=1 (last updated Apr. 16, 2013) [hereinafter DSIRE PTC]. There are various other tax incentives for 
renewable energy. One important one is accelerated depreciation under the Modified Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System, which benefits investors by allowing them to deduct a larger depreciation expense early on 
leading to a lower taxable income. MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS GLOVSKY & POPEO PC, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
PROJECT FINANCE IN THE U.S.: AN OVERVIEW AND MIDTERM OUTLOOK 10 (2010) [hereinafter MINTZ LEVIN], 
available at http://www.greentechmedia.com/images/wysiwyg/reports/MintzLevin-WP-Web-Final-1(2).pdf. 
Another tax credit, the Qualified Advanced Energy Project Credit, was adopted in 2009 and provides a 30% 
credit for any project that re-equips, expands, or establishes a facility to manufacture property that produces 
renewable energy. I.R.C. § 48C (Supp. III 2010).  
 102 The PTC is the newer of the two credits and has been in place since 1992. See DSIRE PTC, supra note 
101 (discussing the recent changes to the credit). 
 103 E.g., id.; DSIRE ITC, supra note 100 (discussing the credit’s history). 
 104 See generally SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 1–5; Roberta F. Mann & E. Margaret Rowe, Taxation, 
in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 17, at 145 (discussing renewable energy tax policy); supra text 
accompanying note 101. 
 105 Dewey, supra note 99, at 1127 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord ERNST & YOUNG MAY 
2012, supra note 7, at 25; Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 188–89. 
 106 I.R.C. § 45. The PTC is indexed to inflation and is currently $.02/kilowatt hour (kWh) or $.01/kWh, 
depending on the technology used. DSIRE PTC, supra note 101. 
 107 See I.R.C. § 45. 
 108 E.g., DSIRE PTC, supra note 101. For example, the PTC expired at the end of 2003 and was not 
renewed until October 2004. Id. 
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Different from the PTC, which is based on actual energy production, the 
ITC allows businesses to receive a one-time federal income tax credit of 30% 
of the amount invested in a renewable energy project.109 Generally, a qualified 
project must be placed in service before 2017.110 Congress expanded the ITC 
under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 in 
response to the economic downturn.111 The ARRA changes were significant 
because they allowed taxpayers eligible for a PTC to elect the ITC instead.112 
Thus, some facilities otherwise not qualified for an ITC may currently take it if 
it is more advantageous.113 
Tax incentives such as the ITC and PTC are often referred to as tax 
expenditures114 and are commonly used to induce certain behaviors.115 
Although they do stimulate investment, academics have questioned the 
efficacy of their use.116 One problem is that they distort market prices and 
behavior because they encourage investments based on the tax savings 
generated rather than on the activity’s economic merit.117 Another problem is 
that they are difficult to target effectively—they generally apply to all business 
activity of a particular type.118 In many cases, a tax incentive may be necessary 
to encourage one player to act but not another.119 
 
 109 I.R.C. § 48 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). For certain technologies it is only 10% and for some it is capped. 
Id.; DSIRE ITC, supra note 100. 
 110 I.R.C. § 48; DSIRE ITC, supra note 100. 
 111 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, secs. 1102–1104, 
§ 48, 123 Stat. 115, 319–21; see also DSIRE ITC, supra note 100 (explaining ARRA’s changes to the ITC). 
 112 ARRA sec. 1102, 123 Stat. at 319. A taxpayer may only use one of the tax credits. See I.R.C. 
§ 48(a)(5)(B).  
 113 I.R.C. § 48(a)(5). Additionally, certain technologies originally eligible only for the 10% ITC are now 
eligible for a 30% ITC. See id. 
 114 The concept was introduced by Professor Stanley Surrey. Miles Mogulescu, Note, The Tax Reform Act 
of 1976 and Tax Incentives for Motion Picture Investment: Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water, 58 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 839, 842 n.22 (1985). Professor Surrey compared tax expenditures to direct expenditures and 
argued that if the government decides to assist a particular activity, it should do so with a direct expenditure 
unless there is a “clear and compelling” advantage to using a tax incentive. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives 
as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 705, 734 (1970). 
 115 Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget 
and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010). 
 116 E.g., id. at 8–10; Surrey, supra note 114, at 726. 
 117 Kleinbard, supra note 115, at 8; Mogulescu, supra note 114, at 842. 
 118 Kleinbard, supra note 115, at 20. 
 119 Id. 
CHACON GALLEYSPROOFS1 7/11/2013  2:01 PM 
2013] LONG-TERM CONTRACTING 1581 
Additionally, tax incentives are inequitable because not all players benefit 
equally.120 Tax incentives are most valuable to those taxpayers with high 
taxable incomes.121 For example, a start-up that does not yet have any profits is 
unable to take advantage of an income tax credit like a Fortune 500 company 
that regularly turns a large profit can.122 
These criticisms of tax incentives apply in the renewable energy context. 
Power producers that do not have tax liability can use the tax credits by 
securing equity investment from taxpayers who do.123 Nevertheless, while a 
portion of the tax benefits is passed on to the power producer, it comes at the 
cost of legal fees to make the contractual arrangements and the return on 
investment required by the equity investors.124 For small projects these 
additional costs could be prohibitive.125 Thus, reliance on the ITC and PTC 
creates inequity and breaks one of the hallmarks of an effective investment 
framework by creating unnecessary costs.126 It also distorts the market for 
renewable energy by allowing renewable-energy power producers to sell 
electricity at a cost that does not reflect the true price.127 
Equally as important, reliance on the ITC and PTC to promote investment 
in renewable energy is problematic because it does not provide long-term 
predictability. As evidence, Congress’s short-term approach has led to large 
investments in renewable energy during the years investors are certain their 
projects will qualify for a tax credit and much less investment in other years.128 
Consider investment in wind energy. The PTC expired at the end of 2003.129 
Almost four times as much wind energy capacity was installed in 2003 as in 
 
 120 Surrey, supra note 114, at 720. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Cf. id. at 721 (comparing the effects of five-year amortization on a taxpayer in the 70% bracket with 
the effect on a taxpayer in the 20% bracket). 
 123 E.g., SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 3, 24. See generally Mann & Rowe, supra note 104, at 145–47 
(discussing various tax equity structures). 
 124 See Penhoet, supra note 33, at 256 (“Enabling high-cost . . . project finance requires a complex series 
of agreements and ancillary documents . . . .”); see also SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 1. 
 125 See Mormann, supra note 57, at 713–14; see also SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 24. 
 126 See Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 189 (noting that inefficiencies of the PTC add substantial costs 
to development). 
 127 See Drew Thornley, Texas Wind Energy: Past, Present, and Future, 4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 
69, 98–100 (2009); cf. Kleinbard, supra note 115, at 8 (“Many tax expenditures, particularly those that are 
designed as business incentives, thus distort market prices . . . .”); Mann & Rowe, supra note 104, at 161 (“Tax 
incentives reduce the relative price of renewable energy . . . .”); Martinot et al., supra note 67. 
 128 E.g., SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 1; Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 188–89. 
 129 E.g., Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 188. 
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2004—1,766 megawatts (MW) versus 467 MW.130 The credit was renewed in 
October 2004 and 2,017 MW of wind energy capacity were installed in 
2005.131 
The wind PTC was again set to expire at the end of 2012.132 Even though 
Congress has renewed the credit repeatedly, there is always a risk that 
Congress may not renew it,133 especially in the recent political climate with a 
Congress fixated on reducing the deficit.134 Ultimately, the PTC was extended 
under the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (H.R. 8)—the bill passed on 
January 1, 2013 to avert the “fiscal cliff.”135 Once again, however, the 
extension is short term—just one year136—and did not occur in time to avoid a 
negative impact on the wind industry.137 It has been reported that uncertainty 
over the past year regarding the extension has “halted development of new 
wind projects” and “layoffs had already begun” due to lack of demand.138 
The start-and-stop approach to investment prohibits more robust 
development of renewables for three primary reasons. First, investors hesitate 
to make long-term commitments when the future of the tax credit is 
uncertain.139 This applies to both renewable energy projects and any related 
 
 130 SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 4; accord Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 188 (reporting that 
1,687 MW of wind were installed in 2003 and only 389 MW in 2004). 
 131 SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 4. For more information on the effect of PTC expiration on wind 
energy development, see Wind Energy Tax Credit Set to Expire at the End of 2012, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8870, which depicts it graphically 
from the PTC’s enactment in 1992 through 2012. 
 132 I.R.C. § 45(d)(1) (Supp. IV 2011). 
 133 Mormann, supra note 57, at 712; see also Dewey, supra note 99, at 1122 (noting the difference 
between Congress’s acting to repeal a statute and letting a statute expire). 
 134 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Dwindling Deficit Disorder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2013, at A21. 
 135 Wind PTC Extension Approved as Lawmakers Strike Fiscal Cliff Package Deal, POWER (Jan. 3, 
2013), http://www.powermag.com/news/5284.html. 
 136 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, sec. 407(a), § 45, 126 Stat. 2313, 2340–
41 (2013). The bill did provide some additional relief for most technologies, including wind, however by 
merely requiring construction to begin by the expiration of the statute rather than for the project to be placed in 
service by the expiration of the statute as previously required. I.R.C. § 45(d); American Taxpayer Relief Act 
sec. 407(a). 
 137 Wind PTC Extension Approved as Lawmakers Strike Fiscal Cliff Package Deal, supra note 135. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives: The Evidence 
Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 68 (2006) (arguing that tax 
incentives should be left in place for at least ten years to be most effective); Wind PTC Extension Approved as 
Lawmakers Strike Fiscal Cliff Package Deal, supra note 135 (citing the American Wind Energy Association in 
saying that uncertainty over continuation of the PTC halted development of new wind projects in the United 
States).  
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manufacturing industry.140 So the country misses out not only on investment in 
more renewable energy projects, but also on the economic benefits that a stable 
renewable-energy manufacturing industry could provide.141 
Second, the short-term nature of tax credits makes projects more costly.142 
Because of the risk that the tax scheme may be modified before a project 
becomes eligible, investors may require higher payments to ensure the projects 
at least break even.143 Also, competition for materials increases as developers 
seek to install new capacity at the same time (before the tax credit expires), 
driving up prices.144 
Lastly, reliance on tax incentives fails to generate stable financing for 
renewable energy because fewer entities can use tax credits during economic 
downturns. For example, the economic decline of 2008 eliminated the demand 
for tax credits.145 Tax credits only stimulate investment if enough entities have 
tax liability to use them.146 The federal government recognized this problem 
and, in response, adopted cash grant147 and accelerated loan guarantee 
schemes.148 
Under ARRA’s Section 1603 cash grant program, developers of renewable 
energy projects could receive a cash grant equivalent to 30% of the capital 
 
 140 Karl Mallon, Myths, Pitfalls and Oversights, in RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY AND POLITICS, supra 
note 55, at 5, 24−25 (explaining that policy schemes that create a “boom–bust cycle” or “sunset” problem are 
inefficient for both the manufacturing and renewable energy industries). 
 141 See id. (noting that a boom–bust cycle is the antithesis of what is necessary to establish 
manufacturing); cf. Wind PTC Extension Approved as Lawmakers Strike Fiscal Cliff Package Deal, supra note 
135 (noting layoffs in the wind energy manufacturing sector). 
 142 See WISER ET AL., supra note 62, at 5 (“[T]here is reason to believe that this increase in the cost of 
wind power has been exacerbated by the erratic boom-and-bust cycle created by the 1- to 2-year PTC 
extensions in recent years.”).  
 143 E.g., Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 315. 
 144 Dewey, supra note 99, at 1128; Chris Gadomski, Challenges Ahead for the US Wind Industry, 
MODERNPOWERSYSTEMS (Aug. 1, 2005), http://www.modernpowersystems.com/features/featurechallenges-
ahead-for-the-us-wind-industry (reporting information provided by the American Wind Energy Association); 
cf. Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 96 (noting that new state RPS mandates drive up prices by creating 
“unexpected surges in demand”). But see WISER ET AL., supra note 62, at 10 (reporting that survey respondents 
did not expect the length of PTC extensions to affect raw material costs). 
 145 SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 4; see also Wind Energy Tax Credit Set to Expire at the End of 2012, 
supra note 131 (“The break in this growth streak occurred in 2010, as an echo effect of the financial crisis and 
recession from late 2008 and 2009. While wind projects were still eligible for tax credits, a lack of investors 
with sufficient tax appetite, or tax-situation ability to take advantage of the credits . . . contributed to slower 
growth for wind capacity in 2010.”). 
 146 SHARIF ET AL., supra note 62, at 4. 
 147 Id.; Mann & Rowe, supra note 104, at 147. 
 148 Kassia Yanosek, Policies for Financing the Energy Transition, DÆDALUS, Spring 2012, at 94, 99−100. 
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costs of the project instead of taking a tax credit.149 However, this provision 
had only a short-lived effect. Project construction had to commence by 2011150 
and the scheme has since expired.151 ARRA also established the Section 1705 
temporary loan guarantee program to promote rapid deployment of renewable 
energy projects using commercial technologies.152 It authorized loan 
guarantees for facilities that commenced construction prior to October 1, 
2011.153 This program has also not been renewed.154 
Congress’s adoption of the cash grant and loan guarantee programs is 
evidence that tax incentives do not create a stable investment environment. 
Nevertheless, the programs have fallen victim to the whims of Congress in 
large part due to concerns about their cost.155 
C. State Mechanisms Promoting Investment in Renewable Energy 
To supplement federal legislation, state legislatures and regulatory bodies 
have adopted numerous measures to encourage investment in renewable 
energy.156 For example, as of 2011, most states had at least one state or local 
tax incentive targeting renewable energy.157 By way of an example of a non-
tax incentive, several states have joined regional gas emission reduction 
initiatives, which allow states to compete to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
 
 149 ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1603, 123 Stat. 115, 364–66 (2009). Like with the ITC, the cap is 10% 
for certain technologies. Id.  
 150 Originally, the grant was only available to projects that began construction before 2011, but the Tax 
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 extended the program for one 
year. Pub. L. No. 111-312, sec. 707, § 1603, 124 Stat. 3296, 3312. 
 151 Id. 
 152 ARRA sec. 406; MINTZ LEVIN, supra note 101, at 10. Section 1705’s Federal Loan Guarantee Program 
was adopted in 2005 to promote the development of clean energy projects using innovative technology; in 
2009, Congress expanded its scope to include commercial-ready renewable energy projects. John A. Herrick, 
Government Nontax Incentives for Clean Energy, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 17, at 169, 189; 
Yanosek, supra note 148. It helps companies obtain affordable financing by guaranteeing loans for up to 80% 
of a project’s capital costs if the project avoids, reduces, or sequesters air pollutants or greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, or if it employs an innovative technology. See 42 U.S.C. § 16512−16513 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).  
 153 42 U.S.C. § 16516 (Supp. IV 2011).  
 154 Section 1705 became the subject of much criticism when Solyndra, a solar company that had received 
a $535 million loan guarantee, declared bankruptcy. E.g., ERNST &YOUNG AUG. 2012, supra note 7, at 25. 
 155 See Daniel R. Cahoy, Investor Enclosure: Abdicating the Green Technology Landscape, 49 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 805, 843 (2012); Latest U.S. Legislation Fails to Provide Extension for Cash-Grant Program, SOLAR 
INDUSTRY (Dec. 27, 2011), http://solarindustrymag.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.9396. 
 156 E.g., THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 17, app. at 559–618; State Actions on Clean Energy: A 
Fifty-State Survey, COLUMBIA L. SCH. CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-
change/resources/law-clean-energy/state-actions-clean-energy-fifty-state-survey (last updated June 26, 2011). 
 157 Mann & Rowe, supra note 104, at 155. 
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emissions and earn funds to invest in renewable energy.158 Additionally, 
several states have “clean energy funds,” consisting of monies collected 
through additional charges levied on public utility bills.159 The funds help 
finance the use of clean energy.160 
The most significant state measure is the RPS.161 An RPS requires electric 
utilities to source a fraction of their electricity from renewable resources or 
purchase renewable energy credits (RECs) from other sources to meet the 
quota.162 An RPS generally sets a mid- to long-range goal and phases it in over 
time.163 Entities that do not comply pay a penalty.164 Currently, twenty-nine 
states and the District of Columbia have a mandatory RPS.165 For example, 
California requires utilities to procure 33% of the electricity they deliver from 
renewable resources by 2020.166 Eight states have renewable portfolio goals, 
which is a voluntary RPS.167 
Even though state RPSs have stimulated large amounts of investment,168 
reliance on them is inefficient because they create a patchwork of differing 
state requirements.169 For example, even in those states that have adopted an 
RPS, the requirements vary by precise goal170 and even in the way they define 
 
 158 Herrick, supra note 152, at 196. Examples include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, REGIONAL 
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, www.rggi.org (last visited July 1, 2013), and the Western Climate Initiative, W. 
CLIMATE INITIATIVE INC., http://www.wci-inc.org (last visited July 1, 2013). 
 159 Herrick, supra note 152, at 197. 
 160 See id.; State Clean Energy Funds Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, www.epa.gov/chp/ 
policies/funds_fs.html (last updated Apr. 2009). 
 161 E.g., Fershee, supra note 49, at 77; Martinot et al., supra note 67. 
 162 E.g., Fershee, supra note 49, at 77. 
 163 E.g., id. For example, when California first passed its RPS in 2002, it required utilities to increase their 
procurement of eligible renewable energy sources by at least 1% of retail sales per year, until reaching 20%. 
S.B. 1078, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002). 
 164 E.g., Fershee, supra note 49, at 78. 
 165 E.g., January 2013 Archive of RPS Data, DSIRE, www.dsireusa.org/rpsdata/index.cfm (last visited 
June 16, 2013) [hereinafter DSIRE RPS Data Spreadsheet]. 
 166 See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25740 (West Supp. 2011). California’s RPS was originally 20% by 2017. 
Cal. S.B. 1078. The deadline to reach 20% was later accelerated to 2010. S.B. 107, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2006). In 2011, the requirement was increased to 33% by 2020. S.B. 2, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
 167 See DSIRE RPS Data Spreadsheet, supra note 165. 
 168 For example, “[i]t has . . . been estimated that RPSs motivated approximately forty-five percent of the 
4300 MW of wind power installed in the United States between 2001 and the end of 2004. Ferrey et al., supra 
note 74, at 150. 
 169 Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal 
Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 404 (2008); Sovacool & 
Cooper, supra note 65, at 88. 
 170 For example, Pennsylvania requires that 18% be derived from alternative energy sources within fifteen 
years after its law took effect, 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1648.3 (West 2008), whereas New York requires 
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renewable resources.171 Compliance becomes onerous because utilities do not 
necessarily operate within one state and therefore must comply with widely 
differing state laws.172 For example, American Electric Power serves 
customers in eleven states, three of which have a mandatory RPS.173 Thus, it 
must ensure the renewable energy it uses meets the definition and percentage 
requirements in all three states. By creating additional compliance costs for 
utilities, state RPSs unintentionally inflate electricity prices.174 
The patchwork also creates inefficiencies in the markets for RECs. The 
differing definitions of renewable energy under state RPSs, including some 
requirements for in-state generation, limit a utility’s ability to purchase an REC 
from out of state to meet the quota.175 Such restrictions “thwart the economies 
of scale that can result from national markets.”176 Additionally, for 
technologies using resources widely considered renewable, such as wind and 
solar, a specific project may offer investors a good return more because of the 
ability to sell the RECs the project generates in numerous states than because 
of the merits of the project itself.177 
In addition, reliance on state RPSs does not create long-term predictability 
because the RPSs themselves are not inherently stable. For example, in several 
states, such as Connecticut178 and Maine,179 there have been attempts to roll 
 
utilities to obtain 30% by 2015. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Establishing New RPS Goal and Resolving 
Main Tier Issues, Case 03-E-0188, at 10 (Jan. 8, 2010); Fershee, supra note 49, at 82. 
 171 E.g., Fershee, supra note 49, at 79–80; DSIRE RPS Data Spreadsheet, supra note 165 (summarizing 
RPS resource eligibility by state).  
 172 Marilyn A. Brown & Sharon (Jess) Chandler, Governing Confusion: How Statutes, Fiscal Policy, and 
Regulations Impede Clean Energy Technologies, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 472, 502 (2008); see also Fershee, 
supra note 49, at 84 (stating that a national RPS would make compliance easier and more predictable). 
 173 Sovacool, supra note 169, at 455; see also About Us, AM. ELECTRIC POWER, http://www.aep.com/ 
about (last visited July 1, 2013) (laying out the states in which it operates); DSIRE RPS Data Spreadsheet, 
supra note 165 (listing the states that have RPSs). The states with an RPS are Michigan, Ohio, and Texas. Id. 
Additionally, four states in which American Electric Power operates—Indiana, Oklahoma, Virginia, and West 
Virginia—have a voluntary RPS. Id. 
 174 Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 88; see also Mormann, supra note 57, at 722 (noting that utilities 
normally pass the additional costs of REC procurement on to customers). 
 175 Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1364 
(2010). 
 176 Brown & Chandler, supra note 172, at 502. One commentator has called the state approach 
“anachronistic” because the electric utility industry is becoming more national. Sovacool, supra note 169, at 
455. 
 177 Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 107−08. 
 178 See Jan Ellen Spiegel, Connecticut Mulls Rollback on Clean Energy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2010, 8:45 
AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/Connecticut-mulls-rollback-on-clean-energy/.  
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back the states’ RPSs.180 Moreover, there is the potential for constitutional 
challenges.181 Dormant Commerce Clause challenges have been brought 
against more than one state that requires in-state generation.182 No court has 
yet determined whether such statutes violate the Commerce Clause, but the 
potential is there, creating uncertainty.183 
Thus, although state initiatives, and particularly the RPS, have played a 
crucial role in stimulating investment in renewable energy, they also do not 
create the long-term, stable environment investors require. This is particularly 
problematic in states that do not require long-term contracts with renewable-
energy power producers because the benefits of any incentives could 
disappear.184 As a result, it is more difficult for renewable energy projects to 
secure financing, and the high cost of any financing available unnecessarily 
inflates renewable energy prices. 
An analysis of Brazil’s experiences in the next Part demonstrates that a 
renewable energy goal can play an important role in an investment framework 
if implemented uniformly in combination with other tools that create long-term 
stability, such as long-term contracts. The combination of these tools 
demonstrates government commitment and creates stability. 
 
 179 See Maine Passes Ambitious Oil Security Bill, Governor LePage’s RPS Rollback Stalls, GEORGETOWN 
CLIMATE CENTER (June 23, 2011), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/maine-passes-ambitious-oil-security-
bill-governor-lepage-s-rps-rollback-stalls. 
 180 See Brendan Demelle, Heartland Institute, ALEC and More Gearing Up to Undermine Renewable 
Energy, DESMOGBLOG.COM (June 25, 2012, 9:51 PM), http://www.desmogblog.com/heartland-institute-alec-
and-more-gearing-undermine-renewable-energy. 
 181 E.g., Davies, supra note 175, at 1368; Ferrey, supra note 5, at 92. 
 182 Davies, supra note 175, at 1368. 
 183 See Lana Chow, The De-Localization Sustainability Initiative: Renewable Energy, SUSTAINABILITY L. 
LEWIS & CLARK L. SCH. (Apr. 6, 2011), http://sustainabilityandlaw.com/2011/04/06/the-de-localization-
sustainability-initiative-renewable-energy-by-lana-chow/ (discussing challenges brought in Massachusetts and 
California); GTH UPDATE Energy: Federal District Court Decisions on Low-Carbon Fuel Standards Affect 
the Pacific Northwest, GORDON THOMAS HONEYWELL (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.gth-law.com/files/gth_ 
update_energy.01.25.2012.pdf (discussing potential for court to rule California mandate unconstitutional under 
the Commerce Clause). 
 184 See Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 193; cf. COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at 11−12, 12 n.20 
(asserting FITs can help utilities meet RPS mandates in jurisdictions where renewable-energy project 
developers cannot secure long-term contracts). 
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III.  BRAZIL’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO PROMOTE INVESTMENT IN RENEWABLE 
ENERGY 
Brazil distinguishes itself from the rest of the world in that 43.9% of its 
energy supply is renewable.185 Hydropower satisfies approximately 80% of the 
country’s electricity needs.186 The risk associated with reliance on hydropower 
became clear in 2001 when severe drought necessitated electricity rationing.187 
As a result, Brazil set out to diversify its energy mix.188 
Since 2002, Brazil has relied on laws requiring long-term contracts for 
fixed prices—first through an FIT189 and more recently through energy 
auctions—to promote investment in renewable energy.190 These mechanisms 
are explored in sections A and B, below. Brazil has also introduced tax 
incentives (section C) and other mechanisms, including a national development 
bank (BNDES) and national climate change policy (PNMC) (section D), to 
complement these laws. These last two measures form an integral part of 
Brazil’s framework as BNDES finances many renewable energy projects,191 
and the PNMC establishes an overarching goal that requires government 
commitment to renewable energy. 
Although Brazil has made multiple policy changes, and also uses short-
term tax incentives, its overall framework has evidenced a commitment to 
developing the renewable energy industry and has provided investors with 
more long-term predictability than in the United States. While the United 
States should not simply imitate the framework Brazil created (and likely 
cannot given differing political climates), the following study of Brazil’s legal 
framework to promote investment in renewable energy can provide the United 
States with valuable guidance in modifying its own legal framework. 
 
 185 KPMG INT’L, supra note 14, at 10. In comparison, the world average is 14% and among developed 
countries it is 6%. Id. 
 186 LAURA PORTO, MINISTÉRIO DE MINAS E ENERGIA, ENERGIAS RENOVÁVEIS [RENEWABLE ENERGY] 
(2007), available at http://www.mme.gov.br/programas/proinfa/galerias/arquivos/apresentacao/VI.pdf. 
 187 See PSI MEDIA INC., 2010 BRAZIL ENERGY HANDBOOK 11 (2009), available at www.psimedia.info/ 
handbooks/Brazil_Energy_Handbook.pdf. 
 188 See id. at 15. 
 189 See generally supra note 98 (describing FIT policies). 
 190 See infra Part III.A–B. 
 191 See RAMÓN FIESTAS, GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL & ABEEÓLICA, ANALYSIS OF THE 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR WIND POWER GENERATION IN BRAZIL 4, 12–13, available at http://gwec.net/ 
wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Brazil_report_2011.pdf; see also UNEP & BNEF 2011, supra note 4, at 43. 
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A. PROINFA: Long-Term Access to the Grid and a Fair Return 
In 2002, Brazil established the Incentive Program for Alternative Sources 
of Energy (PROINFA).192 Unlike PURPA, the goals of which concerned 
general energy conservation,193 PROINFA’s goals specifically included 
increasing renewable generation by IPPs.194 To accomplish that goal, the law 
guaranteed that state-owned utility Eletrobrás would purchase energy from 
IPPs.195 It also required that installations satisfy a minimum national content 
rule196 to promote development of a Brazilian manufacturing industry for 
renewable energy equipment.197 
The law laid out two phases.198 Contracts were to be awarded through calls 
to the public under both, but the parameters differed.199 During Phase I, 
Eletrobrás was to enter into twenty-year PPAs for a total of 3,300 MW of 
installed capacity.200 Different from PURPA, PROINFA required Eletrobrás to 
pay power producers prices based on the “economic value” of the technology 
used.201 The law set rate floors for each technology202 and the Executive 
Branch promulgated further rate guidelines, including an appropriate return on 
capital and most related costs.203 
 
 192 Lei No. 10.438 [Law No. 10.438], de 26 de Abril de 2002, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
29.04.2002 (Braz.).  
 193 See supra Part II.A. 
 194 Law No. 10.438. Eligible renewable resources were limited to biomass, wind, and small hydroelectric. 
Id. 
 195 See id. 
 196 The national content requirements were 60% during Phase I and 90% during Phase II. See Lei No. 
10.762 [Law No. 10.762], de 11 de Novembro de 2003, D.O.U. de 12.11.2003 (Braz.) (amending Law No. 
10.438). 
 197 At the time there was only one manufacturer of wind turbines operating in Brazil. LUIZ BARROSO, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY AUCTIONS: THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE 7 (2012), available at http://siteresources. 
worldbank.org/INTENERGY2/Resources/4114191-1328286035673/D2_Luiz_Barroso.pdf.  
 198 Law No. 10.438. 
 199 Id.; Law No. 10.762.  
 200 Lei No. 10.889 [Law No. 10.889], de 25 de Junho de 2004, D.O.U. de 28.06.2004 (Braz.). As enacted, 
PROINFA required Eletrobrás to enter into fifteen-year contracts. Law No. 10.438. That requirement changed 
to twenty-year contracts in 2004. Law No. 10.889. 
 201 Law No. 10.438. 
 202 Law No. 10.762. The floors were originally set at 80% of the average national tariff to the consumer 
but were amended in 2003 to: 50% of the average national tariff to the consumer for biomass; 70% for small 
hydro; and 90% for wind. Id.; Law No. 10.438. Germany’s FIT legislation, which many countries have copied, 
included a similar pricing scheme except that the floors for biomass and small hydro were higher. See Swisher 
& Porter, supra note 55, at 193. 
 203 Decreto No. 5.025 [Decree No. 5.025], de 30 de Março de 2004, D.O.U. de 31.03.2004 (Braz.). 
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During Phase II, Eletrobrás was to enter into contracts with power 
producers so that renewable energy supplied 10% of the country’s annual 
electric consumption within twenty years from the beginning of Phase I.204 
Phase II has not been implemented, however, and it is possible that it never 
will be given the new regulatory framework discussed in the next section.205 
The costs of PROINFA were to be absorbed by the ratepayers.206 
B. A Switch in Strategy to Power Auctions 
The year 2004 brought a new framework for the power sector—a hybrid 
approach that split the sector into regulated and unregulated markets for 
different producers and consumers—but maintained the requirement that 
suppliers enter into long-term contracts with IPPs.207 Among the goals of the 
new model were security of supply, lower tariffs, and a just return to 
investors.208 The framework “features a strict planning of the sector”209 and 
requires electricity distributors to purchase energy only through competitive 
tenders.210 
Long-term contracts—between three and fifteen years for existing projects 
and between fifteen and thirty-five years for new projects—are awarded 
through government auctions.211 Requiring long-term contracts ensures a stable 
return to investors and helps finance the sector’s expansion.212 Under the new 
 
 204 Law No. 10.438. 
 205 BARROSO, supra note 197, at 6; OSVALDO SOLIANO PEREIRA, CENTRO BRASILEIRO DE ENERGIA E 
MUDANÇA DO CLIMA, LEAP INTO GREEN GROWTH: PROMOTING CLEAN TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURING 
(2011), available at http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/ 
Policy%20and%20regulatory%20issues%20Brazil.pdf. 
 206 Law No. 10.438; PEREIRA, supra note 205.  
 207 Lei No. 10.848 [Law No. 10.848], de 15 de Março de 2004, D.O.U. de 16.03.2004 (Braz.); Country 
Analysis Briefs: Brazil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/cabs/brazil/Full.html (last updated 
Feb. 28, 2012). 
 208 See, e.g., CENTRO DE ESTUDOS DAS SOCIEDADES DE ADVOGADOS, LEGAL GUIDE FOR THE FOREIGN 
INVESTOR IN BRAZIL 159 (2006); PEREIRA, supra note 205. 
 209 CENTRO DE ESTUDOS DAS SOCIEDADES DE ADVOGADOS, supra note 208, at 149. 
 210 Law No. 10.848; PSI MEDIA INC., supra note 187, at 11. This governs the purchase of all energy, not 
just renewable energy, to ensure adequate supply. See LUIZ AUGUSTO BARROSO ET AL., AUCTIONS OF 
CONTRACTS AND ENERGY CALL OPTIONS TO ENSURE SUPPLY ADEQUACY IN THE SECOND STAGE OF THE 
BRAZILIAN POWER SECTOR REFORM 4–5 (2006), available at www.psr-inc.com/psr/download/papers/Brazil_ 
paper_GM0205.pdf. 
 211 Law No. 10.848. 
 212 CENTRO DE ESTUDOS DAS SOCIEDADES DE ADVOGADOS, supra note 208, at 157. 
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model, there have been auctions specifically for new renewable energy 
projects.213 
C. Complementary Tax Incentives 
Although the primary impetus behind investment in renewable energy in 
Brazil has been programs awarding long-term contracts to IPPs, Brazil has 
enacted complementary tax incentives. For example, in 2007, Brazil adopted a 
special incentive program to promote investment in infrastructure projects 
(REIDI).214 Entities that buy or import new instruments for use in an 
infrastructure project are exempted for up to five years from paying two types 
of taxes related to that purchase.215 
Additionally, there are tax incentives specific to renewable energy. Wind 
and solar generating equipment may be exempt from sales tax (ICMS) through 
2015.216 This exemption was first adopted in 1997.217 As with the tax credits in 
the United States, it is not stable—it has been modified various times since it 
was first adopted and has been extended on multiple occasions for only short 
periods of time (anywhere from one month to three years at a time).218 Also for 
wind equipment there is an exemption from a tax on industrialized products.219 
More recently, in April 2012, regulations were adopted allowing solar 
plants of up to 30 MW that begin commercial operation by December 31, 
2017, a discount of 80% on distribution and transmission tariffs for the first ten 
years of operation.220 
 
 213 Marília Rabelo Corrêa, Renewable Energy in Brazil - Perspectives, http://65.110.85.160/academy/ 
magazine/RENEWABLE%20ENERGY%20IN%20BRAZIL%20-%20E-MAGAZINE.pdf (last visited June 
17, 2013). 
 214 Lei No. 11.488 [Law No. 11.488], de 15 de Junho de 2007, D.O.U. de 15.06.2007 (Braz.). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Convênio ICMS 75 [Agreement ICMS 75], de 14 de Julho de 2011, D.O.U. de 18.07.2011 (Braz.). It 
has been reported that this exemption provides a benefit of up to 17%. Confaz prorroga isenção de ICMS para 
energia eólica [Confaz Extends ICMS Exemption for Wind Energy], BRASELCO, http://www.braselco.com. 
br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=106:confaz-prorroga-isencao-de-icms-para-energia-
eolica&catid=4:noticias&Itemid=4&lang=en (last visited June 1, 2013). 
 217 Convênio ICMS 101 [Agreement ICMS 101], de 12 de Dezembro de 1997, D.O.U. de 18.12.1997 
(Braz.). 
 218 See Confaz Extends ICMS Exemption for Wind Energy, supra note 216; Convênio ICMS 101/97, 
MINISTÉRIO DA FAZENDA, www.fazenda.gov.br/confaz/confaz/convenios/ICMS/1997/CV101_97.htm (last 
visited June 1, 2013). 
 219 Christiana Sciaudone, Brazil Exempts Imported Wind Equipment from 14% Tax, RECHARGE NEWS, 
http://www.rechargenews.com/news/americas/article1283053.ece (last updated Nov. 25, 2012). 
 220 Resolução Normativa No. 481 [Normative Resolution No. 481], de 17 de Abril de 2012, D.O.U. de 
20.04.2012 (Braz.); ANEEL Approves Rules to Facilitate the Generation of Energy in Consumer Units, 
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D. Development Bank and Climate Change Policy Round Out the Framework 
Additional non-tax mechanisms play a significant role in Brazil’s 
framework today. One of the most important is BNDES,221 which offers 
financing for renewable energy projects.222 Generally, BNDES offers favorable 
terms including, for example, sixteen-year loans with interest rates lower than 
the central bank benchmark rate.223 
Additionally, in December 2009, Brazil adopted the PNMC.224 The PNMC 
has among its goals the compatibility of social–economic development, 
protection against climate change, and the reduction of GHG emissions.225 It 
commits to reducing GHG emissions in Brazil between 36.1% and 38.9% by 
2020.226 A presidential decree outlined a plan for accomplishing this goal, 
including increased use of electricity generated from renewable resources.227 
Thus, over the past decade Brazil has helped ensure that renewable energy 
projects could secure financing by guaranteeing investors a fixed return 
through a long-term contract228 and by providing cost-effective loans.229 
Recently, Brazil has enacted additional measures targeting renewable energy to 
complement the long-term contracts. These measures have not been 
implemented without error, however. For example, Brazil has undermined its 
efforts to some extent by abandoning Phase II of PROINFA230 and by enacting 
only short-term tax incentives.231 Nevertheless, the overall commitment the 
 
AGÉNCIA NACIONAL DE ENERGIA ELÉTRICA (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.aneel.gov.br/aplicacoes/noticias_ 
area/dsp_detalheNoticia.cfm?idNoticia=5461&idAreaNoticia=347. 
 221 See BNDES, www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/ (last visited July 1, 2013). 
 222 FIESTAS, supra note 191, at 12–13; see UNEP & BNEF 2011, supra note 4, at 43. 
 223 See Stephan Nielsen, BNDES Shuts Five Firms Out of Brazil Wind Turbine Market, RENEWABLE 
ENERGY WORLD.COM (July 20, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/07/ 
bndes-shuts-five-firms-out-of-brazil-wind-turbine-market. In July 2012, BNDES terminated financing for five 
large wind-turbine manufacturers in Brazil because they failed to meet the local content rule requiring turbine 
makers to source 40% of their components from Brazilian suppliers. Id. This caused Brazil to fall back down 
to number ten in the Ernst & Young Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Indices. ERNST & YOUNG 
AUG. 2012, supra note 7, at 21. 
 224 Lei No. 12.187 [Law No. 12.187], de 29 de Dezembro de 2009, D.O.U. de 29.12.2009 (Braz.). 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Decreto No. 7.390 [Decree No. 7.390], de 9 de Dezembro de 2010, D.O.U. de 10.12.2010 (Braz.). 
 228 See supra Part III.A–B. 
 229 See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 230 See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 231 See supra note 218 and accompanying text. Most recently, Brazil has undermined its efforts by 
cancelling energy auctions, which contributed to its fall in the May 2013 Ernst & Young Renewable Energy 
Country Attractiveness Indices. See supra note 15. 
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country has shown to renewable energy has created more long-term 
predictability for investors than in the United States. The following Part draws 
lessons from Brazil’s experience through an examination of its successes and 
failures. 
IV.  LESSONS FROM BRAZIL’S EXPERIENCES 
Brazil’s attempts to diversify its electrical energy matrix earned it 
recognition as a renewable energy powerhouse and for its corresponding 
increase in planned renewable energy investments.232 Part III’s examination of 
Brazil’s legal framework, designed to promote investment in renewable 
energy, provides valuable insight into those elements that give investors the 
long-term predictability they need to make cost-effective investment 
commitments. The United States should not simply copy Brazil because the 
most appropriate framework for a particular country depends on the country’s 
political, economic, and environmental conditions (and because Brazil’s 
framework is not perfect).233 However, the United States should apply the 
following four lessons to create an efficient legal framework: (1) long-term 
contracts are crucial; (2) prices matter; (3) tax incentives should supplement, 
but not be the principal focus of, the framework; and (4) renewable energy use 
goals can ensure that contracts are made in a cost-effective manner. These 
lessons are discussed below in sections A to D, respectively. 
A. Nonutility Power Producers Need Access to Long-Term Contracts 
The most stable element of Brazil’s legal framework to promote investment 
in renewable energy during the past decade has been the mandatory long-term 
contract or PPA.234 Although Brazil’s framework has changed multiple 
times—from an FIT and quota under PROINFA to a competitive auction 
 
 232 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. In addition to its rapid increase in the rankings as an 
attractive country for renewable energy investment between 2009 and 2011, Brazil’s successes have been 
demonstrated by the record low prices at which renewable energy has been contracted for. Stephan Nielsen & 
Christiana Sciaudone, Wind Power Sells at World’s Lowest Rate in Brazil Auction, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 
2012, 9:01 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-14/four-developers-sign-wind-contracts-in-brazil-for-
282-megawatts.html. 
 233 Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 315; Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 185. 
 234 See supra Part III.A–B; cf. Laurens J. de Vries, Mandatory Long-Term Contracts for Renewable 
Energy: The Best of Both Worlds?, in 2011 8TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EUROPEAN ENERGY 
MARKET (EEM) 586, 589 (2011), available at http://www.nextgenerationinfrastructures.eu/download.php? 
field=document&itemID=585188 (noting that Brazil has found the solution to ensuring adequate generating 
capacity in long-term contracts). 
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system—it has consistently provided renewable-energy power producers with 
access to long-term PPAs.235 
Long-term contracts mitigate risk by guaranteeing that power producers 
receive an established price for a certain amount of generation over the life of 
the contract.236 By locking in a buyer and a price, these contracts alleviate 
concerns that a power producer will not be able to sell the electricity it 
produces and earn a fair return on the investment.237 They allow capital-
intensive and risky renewable energy projects to secure financing because 
investors can calculate their return and creditors can feel confident that the 
borrower will repay any loan extended.238 Thus, a long-term contract provides 
the long-term stability investors and creditors need to commit to financing a 
renewable energy project.239 
A firm commitment to long-term contracting over the past decade has also 
added much-needed stability to the investment environment in Brazil. For 
various reasons, such as frequent prolongation of PROINFA’s Phase I, 
abandonment of Phase II, and short-term extensions of tax benefits, Brazil’s 
approach likely created some uncertainty among investors.240 In fact, three 
days before the first wind auction in 2009, the sales tax incentive241 was 
extended only one month.242 The executive director of wind energy 
organization ABEEólica speculated that about 30% of the projects that had 
 
 235 See supra Part III.A–B. 
 236 See Disputa entre Ceará e Rio Grande do Norte [Dispute Between Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte], 
BRASELCO, http://www.braselco.com.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=138%3Adisputa 
-entre-ceara-e-rio-grande-do-norte&catid=4%3Anoticias&Itemid=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 16, 2012); cf. 
de Vries, supra note 234, at 588 (asserting that if short-term pricing continues to dominate the electricity 
market, investment risk will increase and the unpredictability will discourage the investment needed to reduce 
fossil fuel consumption and carbon emissions). 
 237 See Sérgio Ruck Bueno, Associação prevê redução no preço da energia eólica no leilão A-5 
[Association Predicts Price Reduction of Wind Energy], VALOR (Apr. 10, 2011, 3:23 PM), http://www.valor. 
com.br/empresas/1035504/associacao-preve-reducao-no-preco-da-energia-eolica-no-leilao-5; Dispute Between 
Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte, supra note 236. 
 238 See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at viii–ix; see also Wellington Bahnemann, Mudança põe em risco 
leilão de energia eólica [Change Puts Wind Energy Auction at Risk], ESTADÃO (Dec. 14, 2009), 
http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,mudanca-poe-em-risco-leilao-de-energia-eolica,481524,0.htm 
(discussing the need for investors to recalculate project viability after tax credit was not extended); Dispute 
Between Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte, supra note 236. 
 239 See Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314 (“Regulatory risk can be reduced if policies provide legally 
enforceable long-term guarantees.”). 
 240 See Mallon, supra note 140, at 25 (cautioning against excessive policy change); Bahnemann, supra 
note 238 (discussing the potential effect of the short-term sales tax extension on the first wind energy auction). 
 241 See supra notes 216–18 and accompanying text. 
 242 Bahnemann, supra note 238. 
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signed up for the auction would not participate as a result.243 In the end, 
however, the auction took place as planned and 1,806 MW were contracted for 
at an average price about 21% below the auction’s ceiling price,244 which had 
been set based on a continuing sales tax incentive.245 
Therefore, Brazil has been able to promote renewable energy development 
despite some evidence of unstable policies. Its success is likely due to a 
demonstrated overall societal commitment to renewable energy through 
continued reliance on long-term contracting,246 as well as the insulation that 
those contracts provide from policy changes.247 Even though investors may not 
be assured of a sales tax incentive over the life of a project, they can rely on 
having a buyer for their energy at a fixed price, which is a greater guarantee 
than many investors in the United States receive. 
It is important to note that the contract terms must be appropriate for the 
country’s investment climate and industry development.248 In Brazil, although 
Eletrobrás was able to enter contracts for the full amount of renewable energy 
generation required under PROINFA,249 many of the projects contracted for 
took many years to build, causing several extensions of PROINFA.250 The 
problems were attributed to various causes including developers’ inability to 
meet national content requirements for wind turbines and high interest rates.251 
These problems were corrected as foreign wind manufacturers entered 
Brazil252 and the cost of wind energy fell.253 The repeated extension of 
PROINFA, however, likely caused uncertainty in the meantime.254 
 
 243 Id. 
 244 Press Release, Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, Primeiro leilão de energia eólica do país viabiliza a 
construção de 1.805,7 MW [Country’s First Wind Auction Secures Construction of 1,805.7 MW] (Dec. 14, 
2009), available at http://www.epe.gov.br/imprensa/PressReleases/20091214_1.pdf. 
 245 Bahnemann, supra note 238. 
 246 Cf. Karl Mallon, Ten Features of Successful Renewable Markets, in RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY AND 
POLITICS, supra note 55, at 35, 62–64 (arguing that an overarching statement of objective allows for changes to 
be made within a policy framework without destabilizing the industry). 
 247 See Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314. 
 248 See UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., FINANCING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
45–46 (2010), available at http://ynccf.net/pdf/Climate_Finanace/GEE21_GlobalClimateChangeMitigation_ 
ESE37.pdf (discussing the creation of effective financing mechanisms). 
 249 See PORTO, supra note 186 (showing that a total of 3,299.40 MW were contracted for under 
PROINFA). 
 250 See FIESTAS, supra note 191, at 5. 
 251 Edward Russell, Not a Breeze, PROJECT FIN., July 2011, at 43. 
 252 Gabriela Elizondo Azuela & Luiz Augusto Barroso, Design and Performance of Policy Instruments to 
Promote the Development of Renewable Energy: Emerging Experience in Selected Developing Countries 16 
(World Bank, Energy & Mining Sector Bd. Discussion Paper No. 22, 2011) (attributing the entrance of foreign 
manufacturers to renewable energy auctions). Ultimately, national content requirements appear to have 
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B. The Price Must Be Right 
Brazil’s experience demonstrates not only the importance of locking in a 
price, but also of getting that price right. Ultimately, the price offered to 
renewable energy projects determines whether a developer will commit to 
investing in the project.255 
A comparison of the performance of Brazil’s biomass sector under 
PROINFA and the auction mechanism suggests that price plays a central role 
in encouraging investment in renewable energy projects. PROINFA set price 
floors depending on the technology used, with that for biomass as the 
lowest.256 The price ultimately set varied by specific source material but was 
only about half the price of wind.257 Under this pricing scheme, Eletrobrás’s 
request for bids resulted in contracts for less than 700 MW of biomass 
energy,258 rather than the 1,100 MW initially allotted.259 The auctions, in 
contrast, resulted in 3,515 MW of new biomass capacity by 2010.260 Evidently, 
many more biomass projects were contracted for under the competitive auction 
system than under PROINFA. Given this, and the emphasis commentators 
place on the importance of not setting the price under an FIT too low,261 it 
 
benefitted Brazil to some extent by attracting foreign manufacturers to set up shop in the country, but the 
requirements were unrealistic to apply immediately and made it impossible to complete PROINFA on time. 
 253 See Russell, supra note 251.  
 254 See Mallon, supra note 140, at 25 (cautioning against excessive policy change). 
 255 See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at vii (“A comparison of FIT policies suggests that those that are 
most effective in meeting deployment objectives have designed their FIT payments to cover the [renewable 
energy] project cost, plus an estimated profit. This effectiveness arises from the fact that developers are 
reluctant to invest unless they are relatively certain that the revenue streams generated from overall electricity 
sales are adequate to cover costs and ensure a return.” (citations omitted)); Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 
195 (noting that the price is a critical factor of an FIT). 
 256 Lei No. 10.438 [Law No. 10.438], de 26 de Abril de 2002, D.O.U. de 29.04.2002 (Braz.). 
 257 See PEREIRA, supra note 205. For example, whereas the price for bagasse was about $.03/kWh, the 
price for wind power ranged between $.058 and $.066/kWh. Id. 
 258 See PORTO, supra note 186, at 6. 
 259 PEREIRA, supra note 205 (noting that during Phase I, 1,100 MW were allotted to each technology, 
including biomass). 
 260 MAURICIO T. TOLMASQUIM, EMPRESA DE PESQUISA ENERGÉTICA, OUTLOOK FOR ALTERNATIVE 
RENEWABLE ENERGY IN BRAZIL (2010), available at http://www.iamericas.org/lajolla/Presentations/Mauricio 
%20Tolmasquim.pdf. 
 261 See, e.g., COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at vii (“A comparison of FIT policies suggests that those that 
are most effective in meeting deployment objectives have designed their FIT payments to cover the [renewable 
energy] project cost, plus an estimated profit. This effectiveness arises from the fact that developers are 
reluctant to invest unless they are relatively certain that the revenue streams generated from overall electricity 
sales are adequate to cover costs and ensure a return.” (citations omitted)); Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 
195 (noting that if an FIT’s price is set too low, there will be insufficient market incentive for renewable 
energy development to occur). 
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seems that at least part of the reason why biomass did not perform well under 
PROINFA may have been that the prices were set too low.262 Differently, at 
the auctions developers bid their own prices.263 
In contrast, the wind industry’s experience suggests that a price that ensures 
investors earn a fair return can do wonders for the development of a nascent 
industry.264 PROINFA, as amended in 2003, set the highest price floor for 
wind of the three types of renewable energy projects targeted.265 Eletrobrás 
received enough bids for wind projects such that a portion of the quota 
originally allotted for biomass capacity was reallocated to wind projects and 
contracts were successfully entered for this additional amount.266 
Under the auction mechanism, the prices for wind generation have fallen 
drastically—prices granted to wind projects at auctions have been as low as 
about 50% lower than PROINFA prices267 and on par with or even lower than 
hydroelectricity and natural gas prices.268 These low prices do not mean 
necessarily that wind was overpriced under PROINFA.269 As Hamilton Moss 
of the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) explained, “Wind 
development in Brazil is a perfect demonstration of basic economic 
laws . . . . With competition, we pushed the price down. . . . People became 
interested in building factories here, so we have a complete chain of producers 
 
 262 See PEREIRA, supra note 205 (pointing out that the premium tariff for biomass was very low and that 
part of the quota for biomass was reallocated to wind and small hydro); MME desiste de preencher cota de 
biomassa no Proinfa [MME Gives Up on Filling Biomass Quota Under PROINFA], JORNALCANA (Feb. 24, 
2005, 9:37 AM), http://www.jornalcana.com.br/noticia/Jornal-Cana/9963+MME-desiste-de-preencher-cota-
de-biomassa-no-Proinfa (reporting that industry blamed the inability to contract for 1,100 MW of biomass 
capacity under PROINFA on the low price to be paid by Eletrobrás). 
 263 Nielsen & Sciaudone, supra note 232. 
 264 As of 2011, over 97% of all wind power installations in Brazil were PROINFA projects. FIESTAS, 
supra note 191, at 5. 
 265 See Lei No. 10.762 [Law No. 10.762], de 11 de Novembro de 2003, D.O.U. de 12.11.2003 (Braz.). 
 266 See PORTO, supra note 186 (showing that contracts for 1,422.92 MW of wind power were entered into 
under PROINFA). The original allotment to wind power under PROINFA was 1,100 MW. PEREIRA, supra 
note 205 (noting that during Phase I, 1,100 MW were allotted to each technology). 
 267 FIESTAS, supra note 191, at 12. 
 268 See Renewable Energy World Editors, Price of Wind Lower than Gas, Hydro in Brazil Auction, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD.COM (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/ 
2011/08/price-of-wind-lower-than-gas-hydro-in-brazil-auction. These prices may reflect recent tax incentives, 
in part, but they have continued dropping even since the tax incentives were enacted. 
 269 Although, it has been noted that prices based on average retail prices, as in Brazil, can lead to windfall 
profits in the event that electricity prices increase. See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at 21.  
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here now and they have prospered.”270 In other words, the high PROINFA 
prices allowed investors to take a risk and the wind industry to gain the 
experience it needed to lower costs and compete with more established types 
of energy. 
While wind’s competitiveness in Brazil is momentous, it is crucial to note 
the following: the price of wind fell below those of hydro and natural gas in 
late 2011, so it remains to be seen whether all projects will get financed and 
built;271 it remains to be seen whether prices will remain that low;272 and Brazil 
promoted wind because of the vast wind resources it has273 so replication will 
depend on a country’s specific environmental endowment. Despite these 
cautions, Brazil’s experience does suggest that a firm commitment to 
renewable energy development and competition among power projects can 
drive prices down. 
Thus, as the varied experiences of wind and biomass in Brazil suggest, 
offering renewable-energy power producers an appropriate price is crucial. Just 
providing for a long-term contract that locks in a fixed price is not sufficient. 
To encourage developers to actually commit to renewable energy projects, the 
long-term contract must ensure a price that will allow the project’s investors to 
earn a fair return and the creditors to recover the loan.274 Multiple mechanisms 
can be used to set the price. In Brazil, under PROINFA, the government set a 
premium price for each technology.275 Under the auction system, however, the 
government merely sets a ceiling price and power projects bid for contracts. A 
 
 270 Herman K. Trabish, How Did Wind Beat the Price of Natural Gas in Brazil?, GREENTECHMEDIA (Aug. 
29, 2011), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/how-did-wind-beat-the-price-of-natural-gas-in-brazil 
(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Bueno, supra note 237. 
 271 See G. Cunha et al., Fostering Wind Power Through Auctions: The Brazilian Experience, IAEE 
ENERGY F. (Int’l Ass’n for Energy Econ., Cleveland, Ohio), Second Quarter 2012, at 25, 27 (noting that of 
seventy-two wind farms auctioned in 2009, construction of fifty-two of them is already behind schedule); 
Nielsen & Sciaudone, supra note 232 (“The price is prompting concern that some of the planned wind farms 
won’t get built.”). 
 272 See Nielsen & Sciaudone, supra note 232 (“‘This fall in prices isn’t indicative of where prices for wind 
energy [are] going in Brazil.’”). 
 273 See PORTO, supra note 186 (noting that Brazil has a large proven potential for wind energy use).  
 274 Cf. UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., supra note 248, at 10 (stating that bankers take 
“significant comfort” from FITs). 
 275 Some commentators have argued that this type of price-setting mechanism has been the most 
successful at driving renewable energy development around the world. See, e.g., Peter Lynch, Feed-In Tariffs: 
The Proven Road NOT Taken . . . Why?, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD.COM (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www. 
renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/11/feed-in-tariffs-the-proven-road-not-takenwhy (“The FIT 
has proven superior to any other program currently in use around the world . . . .”). As the case of biomass in 
Brazil suggests, however, it only works if the price is set accurately. See supra note 262 and accompanying 
text. 
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competitive system of this sort would be more palatable in the United States 
where emphasis is placed on market competition.276 
C. Tax Incentives Should Complement Rather than Dominate Other Incentives 
Tax incentives aimed at promoting investment in renewable energy may be 
a useful component of an overall renewable energy framework because they 
help signal government commitment to investors.277 On their own, however, 
they are not stable enough to promote continuous investment in renewable 
energy.278 
That tax incentives perform better as a complement to long-term 
contracting than as the crux of a renewable energy framework becomes clear 
when comparing the performance of renewable energy programs in Brazil and 
the United States. In Brazil, PROINFA’s focus was ensuring a fair return in the 
long run; tax incentives played little role.279 PROINFA successfully 
encouraged investors to commit resources to renewable energy projects 
without relying on tax incentives.280 Their introduction, however, has shown 
that they may be helpful in combination with long-term contracting. Over the 
years, Brazil has incrementally changed its framework and included tax 
incentives; at the same time its renewable energy investment has increased and 
Brazil has gained more recognition as a renewable energy powerhouse. Unlike 
in the United States, however, even when tax incentives have been in imminent 
danger of expiration, Brazil’s system based on auctions for long-term contracts 
has been able to retain a majority of planned investments.281 
In contrast, in the United States, as tax incentives have become more 
important, the United States’ ability to instill confidence in investors has 
decreased, resulting in a boom-and-bust investment cycle.282 At the same time, 
the United States has lost its status as global leader in new renewable energy 
 
 276 See Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 196. 
 277 See Bahnemann, supra note 238.  
 278 Brown & Chandler, supra note 172, at 486 (“Policies that subsidize energy technologies on an 
inconsistent and sporadic basis do not motivate rational market behavior.”). 
 279 See supra Part III.A. 
 280 Presidential Decree No. 5.025 also worked to ensure that investors did not receive a windfall from 
investing in renewable energy projects by requiring those contracts entered into to include a price adjustment 
for any incentives that became available. See Decreto No. 5.025 [Decree No. 5.025], de 30 de Março de 2004, 
D.O.U. de 31.03.2004 (Braz.). 
 281 See supra notes 242–45 and accompanying text. 
 282 See supra Part II.B. 
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investment.283 Comparing the United States to Brazil, thus, demonstrates that 
while tax incentives may form part of a legal framework to promote 
investment in renewable energy, they should not be the focus.284 
Brazil’s success results from an overall framework that has provided 
investors with a relatively high level of long-term predictability regarding their 
investment.285 Tax incentives are one piece that has helped stimulate additional 
investment, but they have not been the most important component. 
Furthermore, when implementing tax incentives it is important to keep in mind 
the cautions discussed previously. Tax incentives should not create additional 
costs and should be available to all who need them.286 Brazil has accomplished 
this by extending sales tax incentives287 rather than relying on tax benefits that 
necessitate large incomes or outside investors as the United States does.288 
D. Renewable Energy Targets Ensure Contracts Are Made and Minimize Cost 
Requiring utilities to only source a minimum amount of electricity from 
renewable resources can ensure that renewable-energy power producers get the 
financing they need while limiting the cost of the program. For the most part, 
renewable electricity is more costly than electricity from conventional 
sources.289 So a blanket policy requiring utilities to buy all renewable 
electricity that power producers offer like the FITs adopted in some countries 
would be costly.290 Requiring utilities to enter into a limited number of 
contracts with power producers that use renewable resources can limit the cost. 
Brazil has employed various goals related to renewable energy to spur 
investment. PROINFA required Eletrobrás to contract for 3,300 MW of 
renewable energy during Phase I.291 While placing a cap on the amount of 
 
 283 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. While the United States regained the position of most 
attractive country for renewable energy in May 2013, it is impossible to say whether this will continue, as the 
increase in the rankings is a departure from the trend of recent years. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 284 Even if the political will exists to commit to long-term tax incentives, the other concerns regarding tax 
incentives discussed previously remain. See supra text accompanying notes 117–28. 
 285 See Mallon, supra note 246, at 64 (discussing the importance of an overall framework). 
 286 See supra notes 117–22 and accompanying text. 
 287 See supra text accompanying notes 216–19. 
 288 See supra text accompanying notes 121–26. 
 289 David R. Baker, Renewable Energy Costs Are Starting to Come Down, SFGATE (Feb. 4, 2012, 4:00 
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2012/02/03/BUMP1N30MP.DTL. 
 290 See Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 196 (discussing greater cost impacts on some utilities than 
others in Germany). 
 291 See supra Part III.A.  
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renewable energy that Eletrobrás had to contract for under PROINFA may 
have inhibited more rapid industry growth than otherwise could have occurred 
without a cap,292 it also helped minimize total program costs.293 
Although Phase II, which would have required 10% of electricity to come 
from renewable resources, was never implemented, Brazil has not abandoned 
the concept of establishing a goal pertaining to renewable energy use. The 
PNMC requires Brazil’s people and businesses to reduce GHG emissions in 
part through the increased use of renewable energy.294 This policy can work 
together with Brazil’s other incentives to ensure a sufficient amount of 
renewable energy is purchased. Given Brazil’s focus on a few types of 
renewable resources and the current ability of those resources to compete on 
price with conventional power generation,295 this mechanism appears sufficient 
for Brazil for now. Even if the PNMC does not provide as much incentive as 
an RPS, it does add stability to the framework by signaling government 
commitment to investors, even when individual elements of the framework are 
modified.296 
Comparing the United States’ performance with that of Brazil further 
highlights the importance of using a renewable energy goal in conjunction with 
long-term contracting requirements. The ability of states to meet their RPS 
goals has varied. Texas, for example, required long-term contracts when its 
RPS was implemented and very rapidly got ahead of schedule in meeting its 
goal.297 In contrast, those states without long-term contracting requirements 
had more trouble meeting their mandates.298 These examples demonstrate that 
an RPS works best in conjunction with other policies to create a cost-effective 
framework. 
 
 292 Cf. Mallon, supra note 140, at 23 (“Caps are great for limiting problems, but are a nightmare for 
building solutions. . . . Once capacity meeting the long-term energy cap is in place, a complete halt in activity 
will ensue.”). 
 293 According to a discussion paper by Gabriela Elizondo Azuela and Luiz Augusto Barroso, “the total 
annual cost originating from [renewable energy] generation triggered by both PROINFA and auctions is 
estimated at [$]1.38 billion per year and [$]911 million per year, respectively.” Azuela & Barroso, supra note 
252, at 29. The impact on consumer tariffs, once the costs are spread across ratepayers, is negligible at 1.35% 
from PROINFA and 0.6% from auctioned capacity. Id. 
 294 See supra Part III.D. 
 295 See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 296 See Mallon, supra note 246, at 62–64. 
 297 Martinot et al., supra note 67. 
 298 Id. 
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The United States certainly should not merely imitate Brazil’s framework. 
First, a framework must be appropriate for a country’s conditions.299 Second, 
Brazil has not created a completely stable investment environment. In some 
ways, instability in Brazil has similar causes as in the United States—a lack of 
commitment to a specific law. Furthermore, a start-and-stop investment 
environment is somewhat inherent to the auction mechanism that Brazil has 
chosen because new capacity can only receive contracts under periodic 
auctions.300 
Nevertheless, Brazil’s overall commitment to providing power producers 
with access to long-term contracts, complemented by other mechanisms, has 
demonstrated that Brazil is serious about renewable energy.301 Furthermore, 
because power producers receive long-term contracts, investors and creditors 
need worry less about potential future changes to the country’s energy 
policy.302 
The United States, in contrast, has largely failed to quell investor fears for 
more than a couple of years at a time.303 Part V recommends a new framework 
for the United States based on the lessons from Brazil. The framework’s focus 
is mandatory long-term contracts entered through a market-based, competitive 
process to meet the requirements of a national RPS. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
To recover its position as global leader in renewable energy investment and 
ensure long-term sustainable economic growth, the United States must revamp 
its legal framework to encourage continuous investment in renewable energy. 
Under this new recommended framework, the federal government must assert 
itself more because, as one commentator has said, “when environmental 
problems are national or international in scope, only interactive federalism 
captures all of these benefits while minimizing the deficiencies.”304 
 
 299 See Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 315. 
 300 Azuela & Barroso, supra note 252, at 40.  
 301 Cf. Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 196 (“The key to a booming European wind market, however, 
has been policies that have been relatively stable and long term . . . .”). 
 302 See Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314. 
 303 Some states do a better job than others in filling the gaps in the federal framework and addressing 
investors’ concerns. 
 304 Sovacool, supra note 169, at 475; accord Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 
EMORY L.J. 877, 881 (2011) (advocating “enhanced local authority” in the context of minimum federal 
regulatory standards “to ameliorate the negative consequences of regulatory competition”). But see Brian 
Jansen, Comment, Community Wind Power: Making More Americans Energy Producers Through Feed-In 
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The centerpiece of this new legal model should be a national RPS requiring 
electric utilities to source a specific percentage of the electricity they supply to 
consumers through long-term contracts with nonutility power producers using 
renewable resources.305 To minimize any costs associated with compliance, 
however, a utility should be allowed to generate its own electricity using 
renewable resources if it can do so more cheaply than the competing nonutility 
power producers. Once a utility reaches the minimum percentage, it could 
enter into more long-term contracts with renewable-energy power producers, 
or generate more electricity from renewables itself, but would not be required 
to. Other pieces of the current legal framework, such as tax incentives, could 
form part of the new legal framework but should no longer be the primary 
federal incentive to renewable energy development. 
This suggested framework would provide the long-term predictability that 
renewable-energy project developers need to secure low-cost financing. In that 
respect, it would reduce many unnecessary development costs that the current 
legal framework creates, leading to more investment and lower renewable 
energy prices.306 First, section A discusses the long-term PPAs that utilities 
would be required to enter with nonutility power producers that use renewable 
resources. Section B then analyzes the role the national RPS would play in 
creating a competitive process to minimize the cost of contracting with 
renewable-energy power producers. Lastly, section C addresses potential 
concerns regarding the recommended legal framework, including jurisdictional 
issues and increased electricity costs. 
A. A Framework Based on Long-Term Contracting 
To create a stable investment environment in which potential renewable 
energy projects can secure financing on an ongoing basis, the federal legal 
framework should require utilities to enter into long-term PPAs with nonutility 
power producers that use renewable resources.307 While many commentators 
have discussed the benefits and drawbacks of an FIT for the United States, few 
 
Tariffs, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 329, 343 (2011) (arguing that energy is a regional issue so “state legislators 
are better positioned to create and pass lasting policies”). 
 305 See Martinot et al., supra note 67 (noting that RPS policies do not work where long-term contracts are 
not available). 
 306 See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 89 (advocating a national RPS because the state-based 
approach dramatically distorts private investment). 
 307 E.g., COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at 72–73. 
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have focused on the long-term contract as the lynchpin of a successful FIT.308 
Some commentators recommend that the United States adopt an FIT,309 while 
others suggest that a European-style FIT, based on a mandated premium price, 
would not work in the United States for political reasons.310 
Brazil’s experience with both an FIT (PROINFA) and an auction 
mechanism suggests that the most important aspect of an effective legal 
framework is providing renewable-energy power producers with long-term 
contracts at a sufficient fixed price.311 Locking in the price is crucial because, 
although the technology itself should get cheaper over time, the bulk of the 
costs associated with most renewable energy projects are up-front capital 
costs.312 The expected return, therefore, is based on the capital costs and the 
amount of electricity a renewable-energy power producer anticipates it can 
sell.313 Brazil’s auctions have been successful despite not guaranteeing a 
premium price.314 In fact, the competition that the auction mechanism creates 
has driven prices down, but the assurance of a fixed buyer and price provides 
the stability investors need to commit.315 
Ideally, most long-term contracts required under this new framework 
should be for at least twenty years because that is the lifespan of many 
renewable energy projects.316 For certain technologies, however, the optimal 
contract length may differ.317 For example, developers of technologies that use 
a fuel source like biomass may prefer a shorter contract that aligns with their 
fuel supply contract.318 The new model should respect these technological 
differences.319 Tailoring the framework to the needs of the various 
 
 308 E.g., Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 195–97; Jansen, supra note 304, at 343 (advocating that 
states adopt feed-in tariffs); Lynch, supra note 275 (advocating for a national FIT). 
 309 For examples, see Jansen, supra note 304, at 343, who advocated that states adopt feed-in tariffs; 
Lynch, supra note 275, who advocated for a national FIT; and Craig Morris, Feed-In Tariffs Needed After 
Grid Parity, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD.COM (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/ 
news/article/2011/02/feed-in-tariffs-needed-after-grid-parity. 
 310 Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 196. 
 311 See de Vries, supra note 234, at 589; cf. COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at v (asserting that FITs are 
successful in part because they provide long-term purchase agreements at fixed prices). 
 312 E.g., Gerrard, supra note 17, at 12.  
 313 Mallon, supra note 246, at 52–54. 
 314 See supra Part IV.B.  
 315 See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 316 Mallon, supra note 140, at 23. Wind projects in Brazil generally receive twenty-year contracts. Dispute 
Between Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte, supra note 236. 
 317 See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 55, at 73. 
 318 Id. 
 319 See Mallon, supra note 246, at 45. 
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technologies would allow developers to get the lowest cost financing possible, 
resulting in the least price impact on utilities and ratepayers.320 
Allowing potential renewable energy projects in all states access to long-
term PPAs would allow investors to determine whether a project will provide 
them with a sufficient return and therefore make economic sense. A long-term 
contract reduces the risk associated with making long-term investment 
decisions because it isolates the renewable energy project from potential 
changes to revenue streams, whether market induced or driven by politics.321 
For example, under the current system, an investor runs the risk that a state 
may reduce its RPS or that a utility’s avoided cost may fall during the lifetime 
of the renewable energy project.322 If the electricity generated by the renewable 
energy project is more expensive than that generated from conventional 
sources of fuel, the power producer without a long-term contract may be forced 
to accept a price that does not even cover the project’s costs, let alone provide 
a return to investors. The potential for this scenario makes it difficult for 
nonutility power producers to secure financing and often drives up the cost of 
the financing that is available.323 
PURPA caselaw provides precedent for enforcing long-term contracts 
entered into between utilities and nonutility power producers, regardless of 
changes that occur in the marketplace. For example, in 1995, in Freehold 
Cogeneration Associates v. Board of Regulatory Commissioners, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that under PURPA, a state regulator may not 
modify in any way a previously implemented PPA between a QF and a 
utility.324 In that case, the regulator had ordered the QF to renegotiate its 
contract with the utility after the utility’s avoided cost fell well below the price 
contracted for.325 The court reasoned that Congress had intended to exempt 
QFs from state and federal utility rate regulations so the state regulator was 
preempted from changing the terms of the contract even if it would generally 
have the authority to do so under its administrative power.326 Thus, requiring 
 
 320 See id. at 53–54. 
 321 Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314. 
 322 See supra Part II.A and text accompanying notes 179–83. 
 323 Requiring long-term contracts also has the potential benefit of stabilizing electricity prices in the long 
run. See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 102. By entering into long-term contracts with renewable-
energy power producers, utilities can hedge against volatile fossil fuel prices, stabilizing long-term electricity 
rates. Id.  
 324 44 F.3d 1178, 1194 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 325 Id. at 1183. 
 326 Id. at 1192. 
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utilities to enter into long-term contracts with a fixed price would not be 
inconsistent with current PURPA implementation in those states that require 
long-term contracts. Yet it would require the federal government to assert more 
authority by requiring, rather than permitting, long-term contracts in all states. 
B. Reinforcing the Framework and Minimizing Costs Through a National 
RPS 
Because there is potential for higher costs associated with renewable 
energy, utilities should not have to enter into a contract with all nonutility 
power producers that generate electricity from renewable resources that might 
request one. Rather, the federal government should adopt a national RPS to 
ensure utilities enter into long-term contracts for a minimum amount of 
renewable energy or the corresponding RECs, or generate that minimum 
amount themselves.327 This national RPS should set a floor requiring that a 
minimum percentage of electricity that a utility provides to its consumers be 
produced using renewable resources. It should also allow individual states to 
set higher percentages if they desire.328 Providing a floor but allowing a higher 
percentage requirement would ensure a nationwide minimum standard, while 
allowing states with more renewable resources to encourage additional 
investment.329 Congress set a similar standard in the Clean Air Act of 1965, 
allowing California to establish air pollution emission standards for vehicles.330 
By setting a floor in that case, Congress “ensured that the states could continue 
to innovate while also mandating that all states moved forward in promoting 
cleaner air.”331 
The RPS under the new framework should set a long-term goal with annual 
incremental increases to encourage continuous investment.332 Renewable 
 
 327 Cf. Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-In Tariffs to Meet U.S. Renewable 
Electricity Targets, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 73, 74 (“Although RPS and feed-in tariffs are viewed as 
mutually exclusive policies in Europe, U.S. policy developments indicate that innovative hybrid approaches 
are possible in which feed-in tariffs are integrated into or established in tandem with existing renewable 
targets.”). 
 328 At least one commentator suggests that post-2004 Congress favors federal ceilings over floors as they 
prevent state policy makers from “holding the reins of environmental policymaking.” Sovacool, supra note 
169, at 416. While this may be the case in general, establishing a floor would avoid interfering with states that 
already have higher standards and further encourage investment in renewables. The commentator himself 
recommends a floor in the case of renewable energy. Id. at 472. 
 329 See id. at 472–73. 
 330 Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 141. 
 331 Id. 
 332 Id. at 134; see Mallon, supra note 140, at 23. 
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energy projects often have a lifetime of about twenty years.333 If the goal were 
set for less than twenty years, there would be a “flurry of activity and massive 
industry growth for the first few years” to meet the cap.334 “Once capacity 
meeting the long-term energy cap is in place,” new investment in renewable 
energy projects would likely halt because no new capacity would be needed.335 
Such a scenario would provide little more incentive than the current boom–
bust framework to build up a strong domestic manufacturing industry, so the 
United States would not be able to reap the full benefits of renewable energy 
development. 
To reduce the negative effects of the current system of state RPSs, the law 
should clearly define the type of renewable resources that would count toward 
the RPS. This definition should be all-inclusive and allow for technological 
change.336 Defining fuel sources that are eligible, rather than specific 
technologies, could accomplish this goal.337 Creating a broad definition would 
also ensure that projects that produce electricity to fulfill the requirements 
could be developed in all states.338 This is important because a major concern 
expressed about adopting a national RPS is that not all states are similarly 
endowed.339 Regardless, the RPS should not include any in-state requirements 
because that tends to drive up the price of compliance.340 
By establishing a uniform definition of renewable resources and allowing 
for out-of-state purchases, a national RPS would make compliance easier and 
more predictable than the current state RPSs. Companies that reside in more 
than one state would be able to comply by using the renewable energy that 
makes the most economic sense for the company and ratepayers rather than 
based on what specific renewable resource counts under each state’s RPS.341 
This would reduce compliance costs for utilities.342 Furthermore, because all 
renewable resources would count toward the requirement in all states, investors 
could make decisions based on the economics of the specific project rather 
 
 333 Mallon, supra note 140, at 23. 
 334 Id. 
 335 Id. 
 336 Mallon, supra note 246, at 49. 
 337 Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 135. 
 338 Id. at 147–48. 
 339 Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1442 
(2010); cf. Mallon, supra note 246, at 49 (asserting that the appropriate mix of technologies varies from 
country to country). 
 340 See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text. 
 341 See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
 342 Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 94. 
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than based on those RECs that would have the greatest market potential as may 
happen now.343 
Not only could a national RPS reduce compliance costs, but also it would 
provide investors with more long-term stability than a state RPS because it 
would reduce the potential for legal challenges.344 As discussed above, in many 
states there have been challenges against the RPS, both at the legislative level 
and by utilities, for constitutional reasons.345 By implementing a clear mandate 
with specific permission for the states to adopt more stringent requirements, 
much of the concern about the stability of the state RPSs would be eliminated, 
reducing risk for investors. 
In addition to mitigating the negative effects of the current state patchwork, 
adoption of a national RPS would eliminate many of the current pricing issues 
under PURPA. PURPA prohibits requiring utilities to purchase energy from a 
QF for a cost that exceeds the avoided cost.346 PURPA does not prohibit 
utilities from agreeing to a fixed rate above the utility’s avoided cost, but a 
utility worried about its overall profitability is not likely to agree to a higher 
rate if not required.347 Mandating that electric utilities source renewable energy 
through long-term contracts with nonutility power producers would require 
utilities to negotiate contracts for a fair price that allows the projects to secure 
cost-effective financing. At the same time, allowing a utility to invest in its 
own renewable generation, if it can show it is more cost effective for the 
ratepayers, will limit any unnecessary costs that could arise if utilities did not 
have that option. 
Utilities would be allowed to contract with the power producers of their 
choosing as long as they meet the minimum requirements. Thus, unlike the 
FITs that have been implemented in many countries, the recommended 
framework would maintain a competitive process through which utilities 
would enter into contracts with those renewable-energy power producers that 
best meet their needs.348 
 
 343 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 344 See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 93 (discussing uncertainty regarding duration of state-based 
RPSs). 
 345 See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text. 
 346 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (2006). 
 347 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text; cf. Dewey, supra note 99, at 1113 (arguing it is 
difficult to secure a long-term contract from a utility worried about providing consumers with low rates). 
 348 See supra note 98. 
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Lastly, to ensure that the new framework provides investors with the 
maximum amount of stability and accomplishes the goal of increasing 
renewable energy consumption in the United States, it would be crucial to 
implement an enforcement mechanism.349 This mechanism may consist of a 
national REC trading scheme that allows utilities to track the amount of 
renewable energy they buy, as well as penalties to be paid by those utilities that 
do not comply with the requirements.350 
C. Potential Challenges to the Proposed Framework 
Whether the federal government should promote renewable energy and, if 
so, the design of an appropriate renewable energy policy is the topic of much 
debate. One central issue regards the economic feasibility of using renewable 
energy.351 Politicians are often concerned about raising electricity prices by 
mandating renewable energy use.352 Another contention is whether requiring 
the use of renewable energy should fall on the shoulders of the federal 
government or the states.353 Many opponents of a national RPS, for example, 
believe that state legislatures and agencies are better positioned to make 
determinations regarding the use of renewable energy within their state’s 
borders.354 
These debates aside, until now, the federal government has chosen to 
promote renewable energy, and primarily does so through tax incentives.355 
Furthermore, a majority of the states also promote renewable energy.356 As this 
Comment demonstrates, however, the current legal framework to promote 
renewable energy is not as efficient or cost-effective as it could be. The legal 
framework this Comment recommends creates long-term predictability for 
investors and reduces many of the unnecessary costs associated with the 
current framework, while respecting state and federal boundaries. 
The recommended framework would ensure that renewable energy 
contributes to the current energy matrix in as cost-effective a manner as 
 
 349 See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 139. 
 350 Id. at 138. 
 351 E.g., Mary Ann Ralls, Congress Got It Right: There’s No Need to Mandate Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, 27 ENERGY L.J. 451, 452 (2006). 
 352 E.g., id.; Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 65, at 94. 
 353 E.g., Ralls, supra note 351, at 455–56. 
 354 E.g., id. 
 355 See supra Part II.B. 
 356 See supra Part II.C. 
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possible. Although the prospect of a utility paying above its avoided cost for 
renewable energy may be concerning, requiring utilities to enter into long-term 
contracts with nonutility power producers would help drive renewable energy 
prices down in two respects. First, by reducing investment risk, long-term 
contracts would drive down the required return on investment and cost of debt 
for power producers.357 In turn, renewable-energy power producers should be 
able to reduce the prices they charge to utilities. Thus, ratepayers would pay a 
rate closer to the true cost associated with use of renewable resources while 
reaping all of the benefits they offer, rather than paying more money to 
investors for assuming risk. 
Additionally, the national RPS proposed, rather than a blanket mandate that 
utilities buy electricity from all renewable energy projects (as some FITs do), 
should drive down prices by creating competition between renewable-energy 
power producers. This proposal specifically requires utilities to contract with 
nonutility power producers unless they can show that investing in their own 
renewable energy generation is more cost-effective. This requirement will 
incentivize power producers to continue innovating to generate the lowest cost, 
yet still reliable, renewable energy possible as they will be competing for 
contracts. As the wind energy industry has demonstrated in Brazil, this 
competition should drive the creation of a competitive domestic renewable 
energy industry with improved technology, lowering capital costs for 
renewable energy projects.358 
Under the Federal Power Act, FERC has the power to regulate rates for 
interstate and wholesale transmission of electricity.359 In doing so, it can 
“shape the energy market and affect all stakeholders.”360 As one commentator 
has described it, “The act creates a ‘bright line’ between state and federal 
jurisdiction with wholesale power sales falling on the affirmative federal side 
of the line.”361 Where the federal government has acted in this sphere, states 
are prohibited from acting.362 Wholesale power transactions refer to sales that 
are made “to any person for resale.”363 Sales by power producers to utilities fit 
this definition. Thus, FERC has authority over sales by renewable-energy 
 
 357 Neuhoff, supra note 58, at 314. 
 358 See supra notes 267–70 and accompanying text. 
 359 See supra note 74. 
 360 Ferrey et al., supra note 74, at 180. 
 361 Id. 
 362 Id. 
 363 Id. at 181. 
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power producers to utilities.364 The recommended framework does recognize, 
however, that some states may want to encourage faster development of 
renewable energy and allows them to adopt a higher requirement to do so. 
Different from in Brazil today, under this new legal framework, utilities 
would be on the hook for supplying a certain amount of electricity generated 
by renewable resources. As a result the utilities would ensure that the projects 
they contract with are feasible and the prices not so low that the project could 
not secure financing. Also, power producers would only get paid for actually 
providing electricity, so they would be incentivized to maintain their plants. 
The recommended legal framework, therefore, would eliminate 
unnecessary financing costs associated with the current framework to ensure 
that ratepayers enjoy the benefits of using renewable energy to the full extent 
possible. By providing nonutility power producers increased access to long-
term contracts and stimulating competition that would help drive prices down, 
the new framework would also reduce the current reliance on tax incentives. 
CONCLUSION 
The current legal framework for encouraging investment in renewable 
energy in the United States is inefficient in that it does not provide investors 
with the long-term predictability they need and increases the costs of available 
financing.365 Rather than creating an environment that fosters continuous 
investment and the building of a national renewable-energy manufacturing 
industry, reliance on tax credits and state RPSs has led to a start-and-stop 
investment climate.366 
To take advantage of the environmental and economic benefits that 
renewable energy provides, and to permanently regain its place as global 
leader in renewable energy investment, the United States must reassert its 
commitment to renewable energy and revamp its legal framework. This 
Comment recommends a new legal framework consisting of both a national 
RPS and a requirement that utilities enter into long-term contracts with 
nonutility power producers that use renewable resources to meet the RPS 
requirement, unless they can generate cheaper renewable energy themselves. 
 
 364 Id. 
 365 See Swisher & Porter, supra note 55, at 185. 
 366 See supra Part II.B–C. 
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An examination of Brazil’s experience over the past decade suggests that 
long-term contracting can lead to rapid development of renewables.367 A 
national RPS would ensure that the contracting requirement is implemented in 
a cost-effective manner and that the renewable energy industries continue to 
improve upon current technologies. While additional measures such as tax 
incentives could serve as complementary elements to send positive signals to 
investors about the United States’ commitment to developing renewable 
energy, Brazil has demonstrated that a country committed to renewable energy 
need not have myriad and complicated policies to stimulate investment.368 
Rather, the laws and policies it has in place must be clear and effective. 
It is important to keep in mind that the recommended framework deals only 
with providing efficient incentives to investors. To truly stimulate more rapid, 
continuous, and efficient renewable energy development, a country such as the 
United States must complete its assessment of other areas of the law affecting 
the development and use of renewable energy, including how hospitable an 
approach it has to matters such as siting, environmental permitting, and 
transmission grid issues.369 
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